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The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Universal Declaration),
adopted December 10, 1948, proclaimed that "[e]veryone has the right to life"
and "[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment."' The same approach was taken in the American
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, adopted May 4, 1948.2 At the
time, the vast majority of United Nations Member States still employed
capital punishment. Moreover, the death penalty was also recognized as an
appropriate penalty for major war criminals and was imposed by the postwar
tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo.' When the Universal Declaration's pro-
visions were transformed into treaty law in universal and regional instruments,
the death penalty was specifically mentioned as a form of exception to the
right to life.4
Fifty years later, as we commemorate the anniversary of the adoption of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the compatibility of the death
* M.A. (Toronto), LL.D. (Montreal), Professor of Law and Chair, Ddpartement des
sciences juridiques, Universitd du Quebec A Montrdal.
1. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess.
art. 3, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
2. See American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, art. 1, O.A.S. Doc. OEA/
ser.L./V./I.4 (1948).
3. See Agreementforthe Prosecution and Punishment oftheMajor War Criminals ofthe
EuropeanAxis, Charter ofthe International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, art. 27, 82 U.N.T.S.
279,300; SpecialProclamation bythe Supreme CommanderfortheAllied Powers atTokyo, Jan.
19, 1946, art. 16, 4 Bevans 20, 26, amendedby International Military Tribunal for the Far East,
Apr.26, 1946, art. 16, 4Bevans 27,31 ("Charter ofthe Tokyo Tribunal"); Control CouncilLaw
No. 10: Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes Against Peace and Against
Humanity, Dec. 20, 1945, in NUREMBERG TRIALS FINAL REPORT, Appendix D, art. II(3)(a).
4. See American Convention on Human Rights: "Pact of San Jos6, Costa Rica," Nov.
22, 1969, art. 4, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, 145 (entered into force July 18, 1978) (allowing death
penalty); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, art. 6, 999
U.N.T.S. 171, 174-75 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) (same); Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 2(1), 213 U.N.T.S. 221,224
(entered into force Sept. 3, 1953) (same).
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penalty with international human rights norms seems less and less certain.
The second generation of international criminal tribunals - the ad hoc tribu-
nals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda and the nascent international
criminal court - rule out the possibility of the death penalty, even for the most
heinous crimes.' The basic international human rights treaties have been
completed with additional protocols that prohibit capital punishment.' Fifty-
one states are now bound by these international legal norms abolishing the
death penalty,7 and the number should continue to grow rapidly.'
The importance of international standard-setting was evidenced by
parallel developments in domestic legal systems. The list has grown steadily
from a handful of abolitionist states in 1945 to considerably more than half the
countries in the world having abolished the death penalty de facto or dejure.
According to the United Nations Secretary General in his January 16, 1998
5. The Security Council has excluded use of the death penalty by the two international
ad hoc tribunals created to deal with war crimes in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. See
UNITED NATIONS, SECURITY COUNCIL, STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, Annex, art. 24, § 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993); UNITED NATIONS,
SECURITY COUNCIL, STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA, Annex, art. 23,
§ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994); UNITED NATIONS, ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT, 17 JULY 1998, art. 77, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 (1998) <http://www.un.org/
icc>.
6. See, e.g., Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil andPoliti-
cal Rights, aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty, G.A. Res. 128, U.N. GAOR, 44th
Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 207, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989) (entered into force July 7, 1991);
Protocol No. 6 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty, Apr. 28, 1983, art. 1, Europ. T.S. No. 114
(entered into force Mar. 30, 1985); Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights to
Abolish the Death Penalty, June 8, 1990, art. 1, O.A.S.T.S. No. 73 (entered into force Oct. 6,
1993). The American Convention on Human Rights is also an abolitionist instrument because
it prevents countries that have already abolished the death penalty from reintroducing it. See
American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 4, art. 4, at 145 (dealing with death pen-
alty). Thus, a state that has abolished the death penalty at the time of ratification of the Ameri-
can Convention on Human Rights is abolitionist from the standpoint of international law.
7. See Jean-Bernard Marie, International Instruments Relating to Human Rights, 18
HUM. RTs.L.J. 79,84-86 (1997) (noting that Andorra, Australia, Austria, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El
Salvador, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy,
Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malta, Mexico, Moldova, Mozambique, Namibia,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Portugal, Romania,
San Marino, Seychelles, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Surinam, Sweden, Switzerland, Uruguay,
and Venezuela have ratified abolitionist treaties). These states are abolitionist either dejure or
defacto and have either signed or ratified one or more of the abolitionist treaties. Id.
8. Albania, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cyprus, Estonia, Lithuania, Russia, and
Ukraine have indicated their intention to be bound by international norms prohibiting the death
penalty, either by signing an abolitionist instrument or by publicly declaring their intention to
ratify.
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report to the Commission on Human Rights, 102 states have abolished the
death penalty and 90 retain it.9 Those that retain it find themselves increas-
ingly subject to international pressure in favor of abolition. Sometimes, this
pressure is quite direct, as evidenced by the refusal of certain countries to
grant extradition when a fugitive will be exposed to a capital sentence. Aboli-
tion of the death penalty is generally considered to be an important element
in democratic development for states breaking with a past characterized by
terror, injustice, and repression. In some countries, abolition is effected by
explicit reference in constitutional instruments to the international treaties
prohibiting the death penalty. In others, it has been the contribution of the
judiciary that has brought about abolition of the death penalty. Judges have
applied constitutions that make no specific mention of the death penalty but
enshrine the right to life and prohibit cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment
or punishment.'0
Thus, the question of abolition of the death penalty stands as one of the
sharpest examples of both the evolution of human rights norms and the
ongoing relevance of the broadly-worded texts in the Universal Declaration.
In 1948, Ren6 Cassin and Eleanor Roosevelt rejected suggestions that the Uni-
versal Declaration contain a reference to capital punishment as an exception
to the right to life. They did so not because international law had reached the
stage of abolition, but because they saw such a trend emerging and wanted the
Universal Declaration to retain its relevance for decades and perhaps centuries
to come.1 Half a century later, we must acknowledge their clairvoyance.
While it is still premature to declare the death penalty prohibited by customary
international law, it is clear that we are somewhere in the midst of such a
process, indeed considerably close to the goal. The many signs of this devel-
opment are the subject of this paper.'
2
9. See Question of the Death Penalty: Report of the Secretary-General submitted
pursuant to Commission resolution 1997/12, U.N. ESCOR, Hum. Rts. Comm'n, 54th Sess., 82d
mtg. 18, at 10, U.N. Doe. E/CN.4/1998/82 (1998).
10. See The State v. Makwanyane and Mchunu, 1995 (3) SA 391, 144, 151 (CC);
ROGER HOOD, THE DEATH PENALTY: A WORLD-WIDE PERSPECTIVE 17 (1996) (discussing
Ruling 23/1990 (X.31) AB, Constitutional Court of Hungary, Judgment of Oct. 24, 1990,
Magyar Kozldny (Official Gazette), Oct. 31, 1991); Tibor Horvath, L'abolition de lapeine de
mort en Hongrie, 2 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE CRIMINOLOGIE ET DE POLICE TECHNIQUE 167
(1992) (same).
11. See WiLLIAMA. SCHABAS, THEABOLrONOFTHEDEATHPENALTYININTERNATIONAL
LAW 30-35 (2d ed. 1997).
12. Several recent works provide detailed overviews of international legal issues relating
to abolition of the death penalty. See generally CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: GLOBAL ISSUES AND
PROSPECTS (Peter Hodgkinson & Andrew Rutherford eds., 1996) (discussing death penalty
throughout world); HOOD, supra note 10 (same); SCHABAS, supra note 11 (describing movement
away from capital punishment in international community). For a discussion of the death
penalty in the United States, see generally THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA, CURRENT CON-
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I1 International Legal Norms Concerning the Death Penalty
The issue of the death penalty is associated with two fundamental human
rights norms: the right to life and the protection against cruel, inhuman, and
degrading punishments. Both norms can trace their roots to the great instru-
ments of Anglo-American constitutional law. The guarantee against "cruel
and unusual punishments" was set out in the English Bill of Rights of 1689."3
It was aimed at some of the more barbaric accompaniments of execution that
characterized Stuart England, such as drawing and quartering, disemboweling
while alive, and amputation. The "right to life" was immortalized by the
words of Thomas Jefferson in the Declaration of Independence of 1776."4 The
American revolutionaries sought to protect the right not to be deprived of life
"without due process of law," a not-so-tacit recognition of the legitimacy of
capital punishment. 5 From a historical standpoint, then, neither of these
norms could be considered to challenge capital punishment. Yet in their more
modem formulation, both of these rights have served to restrict and in some
cases to prohibit the death penalty.
A. The Right to Life
The drafters of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 6 of 1948
looked to domestic constitutions 7 for inspiration in preparing a document that
they termed "a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all
nations."' 8 Most of these constitutions were inspired to a greater or lesser
extent by the principles of the English Bill of Rights, 9 the American Declara-
tion of Independence"0 and Bill of Rights,2' and the French Declaration des
TROVERSIES (Hugo Adam Bedau ed., 1997).
13. See 1 W. & M. ch. 2 (1688) (Eng.); see also Anthony F. Granucci, "Nor Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Inflicted": The Original Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REV. 839, 839 (1969)
(noting that English Bill of Rights of 1689 prohibits cruel and unusual punishments).
14. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
15. See Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1141 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting
that Constitution allows capital punishment provided there is due process of law); Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 177 (1976) (same).
16. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 1; see also SCHABAS,supra
note 11, at23-45 (providing academic comment on article 3 of Universal Declaration); ALBERT
VERDOODT, NAISSANCE ET SIGNIFICATION DE LA DECLARATION UNIVERSELLE DES DROITS DE
L'HOMME 99-100 (1964) (same); Lilly E. Landerer, Capital Punishment as a Human Rights
Issue Before the United Nations, 4 HuM. RTS. J. 511, 511-34 (1971) (same).
17. See SCHABAS, supra note 11, at 29 n.12.
18. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 1, preamble.
19. See 1 W. & M. ch. 2 (1688) (Eng.).
20. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776).
21. See U.S. CONST. amends. I - X.
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droits de l'homme et du citoyen.' High on the list of this new international
catalogue of human rights was the "right to life."' However, the scope of this
right had become considerably different, and broader, than it had been when
it was first announced in the eighteenth century, as many participants in the
drafting process took pains to point out.
As such, the Universal Declaration makes no mention of the death pen-
alty. But distinct from the domestic constitutions from which it is derived, the
Universal Declaration also does not explicitly refer to the death penalty as an
exception to the right to life. Indeed, unlike the case of the American Bill of
Rights, it cannot be said that the drafters of the Universal Declaration sought
to preserve the death penalty as an implicit limitation on the right to life. The
debates in the General Assembly's Third Committee during the autumn of
1948 make this quite clear.24
The original draft of the Universal Declaration, prepared by John P.
Humphrey in early 1947, recognized a right to life that "can be denied only to
persons who have been convicted under general law of some crime to which
the death penalty is attached."' But Eleanor Roosevelt, who chaired the
Drafting Committee, cited movement underway in some states to abolish the
death penalty and suggested that it might be better not to make any explicit
mention of the matter.26 Her views found support from the Soviet delegate,
Koretsky, who argued that the United Nations should in no way signify
approval of the death penalty.27 Ren6 Cassin cautioned that even countries
that had no death penalty must take into account the fact that some are in the
process of abolishing it.28 Cassin reworked Humphrey's draft and removed
any reference to the death penalty.29 His proposal found its way, virtually
unchanged, into the final version of the Universal Declaration, despite some
unsuccessful attempts to return to the original proposal." It is clear from the
travauxpriparatoires that the death penalty was considered to be fundamen-
22. See DECLARATION DES DROITS DE L'HOMME ET DU CITOYEN (France 1789).
23. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
24. See SCHABAS, supra note 11, at 35-40.
25. UNITEDNATIONS, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNcIL, COMMrrrTONHUMAN RIGHTS,
IST SEss., REPORT OF THE DRAFTING COMMiTEE TO THE COMMIssION ON HUMAN RIGHTS,
Annex A, art 3, U.N. Doe. E/CN.4/21 (1947).
26. See SCHABAS, supra note 11, at 30 (citation omitted).
27. Id. (citation omitted). His views were supported by Santa Cruz of Chile, and Wilson
of the United Kingdom. See PHILIPPE DE LA CHAPELLE, LA D-CLARATION UNIVERSELLE DES
DROITS DE L'HOMME ET LE CATHOLICISME 94 (1967).
28. See SCHABAS, supra note 11, at 30.
29. See id. at 31 (citations omitted).
30. See id.
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tally incompatible with the protection of the right to life, and that its abolition,
although not immediately realizable, should be the "common standard of
achievement" of the Member States of the United Nations. 1 Subsequent
interpretation by General Assembly and Economic and Social Council resolu-
tions supports this conclusion.3 2
The Universal Declaration was not intended to establish binding treaty
obligations. However, it provided the normative framework for the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the three major regional
human rights treaties. A chronological perspective on the adoption of these
treaty provisions shows that although the death penalty was retained as an
exception or limitation on the right to life, it has been progressively restricted
in scope.
The European Convention of Human Rights (European Convention),
adopted less than two years after the Universal Declaration, recognizes the
right to life, "save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his
conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law."33 It reflects
the postwar context in Europe, when war crimes trials (and the resulting
executions) were still fresh in the collective memory. The provision was
almost immediately anachronistic. There have been only a handful of execu-
31. A Soviet amendment calling for addition of a paragraph providing for the abolition
of the death penalty in time of peace (Union ofSoviet Socialist Republics: Amendment toArticle
3, U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 3d Sess., Annex, at 14, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/265 (1948)) was deemed
premature and was rejected by twenty-one votes to nine, with eighteen abstentions. See U.N.
GAOR 3d Comm., 3d Sess., 107th mtg. at 185, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.107 (1948). The vote,
however, can in no way be interpreted as a gesture favorable to the death penalty.
32. G.A. Res. 2393, U.N. GAOR, 23d Sess., Supp. No. 18, at 41-42, U.N. Doc. A/7218
(1969); G.A. Res. 2857, U.N. GAOR, 26th Sess., Supp. No. 29, at 94, U.N. Doc. A/8429
(1972); G.A. Res. 61, U.N. GAOR, 32d Sess., Supp. No.45, at 136, U.N. Doc. A/32/45 (1978);
G.A. Res. 128, supra note 6, at 207; E.S.C. Res. 1745, U.N. ESCOR, 54th Sess., Supp. No. 1,
at4, U.N. Doc. E/5367 (1973); E.S.C. Res. 1930, U.N. ESCOR, 58th Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 35,
U.N. Doc. E/5664 (1975); see UNITEDNATIONS, ECONOMIiCAND SOCIAL COUNCIL, REPORT OF
THE SECRETARY GENERAL, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 44th Sess., Agenda Item 13, § 11, at 4, U.N.
Doc. E/5242 (1973).
33. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
supra note 4, art. 2(1), at 224; see also SCHABAS, supra note 11, at 222-38 (discussing death
penalty and European Convention on Human Rights); JACQUES VELU & RUSEN ERGEC, LA
CONVENTIONEUROPtENNEDESDROITSDEL'HOMME37-39, 169-71 (1990) (same); Gilbert Guil-
laume, Article 2, in LA CONVENTION EUROPENNE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME: COMMENTAIRE
ARTICLEPARARTICLE 143-54 (L.E. Pettiti etal. eds., 1995) (same); B.G. Ramcharan, TheDraft-
ing History ofArticle 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights, in THE RIGHT TO LIFE
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 57-61 (B.G. Ramcharan ed., 1985) (same); Alphonse Spielmann, La
Convention europdenne des droits de l'homme et la peine de mort, in PRSENCE DU DROIT
PUBLIC El DES DROITS DE L'HOMME, MLANGES OFFERTS A JACQUES VELU 1503-27 (1992)
(same).
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tions within Member States of the Council of Europe since 1950. By the early
1970s, the Council of Europe had begun work on a protocol to the Conven-
tion, which was adopted in 1983,"4 that modifies article 2 by abolishing the
death penalty in peacetime.35 In 1989, the European Court of Human Rights
observed that capital punishment has been abolished de facto in the Contract-
ing States of the European Convention.36
Negotiation of a human rights treaty took considerably more time in the
United Nations than in the Council of Europe. Although drafting work was
already underway as early as 1947, it was not until 1966 that the treaty in-
tended to accompany the Universal Declaration, the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (International Covenant), was adopted.37 It took
yet another ten years before the instrument had obtained the necessary thirty-
five ratifications for it to enter into force. The "right to life" provision, article
6, was drafted during the 1957 session of the Third Committee of the General
Assembly." Although only seven years younger than the corresponding text
34. See Protocol No. 6 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty, supra note 6, at 2-4
(abolishing death penalty).
35. See id art. 2, at 2 (permitting death penalty in time of war); see also SCHABAS, supra
note 11, at 238-56; A. Adinolfi, Premier instrument international sur l'abolition de lapeine
de mort, 58 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROrr Pi-NAL 321-24 (1987); Gilbert Guillaume,
Protocole no 6 glla Convention de sauvegarde des droits de l'homme et des libertisfonda-
mentales concernant l'abolition de la peine de mort, in LA CONVENTION EUROPENNE DES
DROITS DE L'HOMME: COMMENTAIRE ARTICLE PAR ARTICLE, supra note 33, at 1067-72; Erik
Harremoes, The Council of Europe and Its Efforts to Promote the Abolition of the Death
Penalty, 12-13 CRIME PREVENTION AND CRIM. JUST. NEwSL. 62 (1986); Peter Leuprecht, The
First International Instrument for the Abolition of the Death Penalty, 2 FORUM 2 (1983).
36. See Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 40 (1989) (noting that
defacto death penalty no longer exists); see also (Qinarv. Turkey, 79-A Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec.
& Rep. 5, 9 (1994) (citing Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 40) (noting that death penalty
no longer exists); H. v. Sweden, 79-A Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 85, 94 (1994) (mention-
ing death penalty). Nevertheless, in recent years it has been pronounced (although not imposed)
in Turkey, Poland, and Belgium.
37. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 4, at 171.
38. See id. at 174-75 (discussing right to life). Article 6 states:
1. Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be
protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.
2. In countries which have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of death
may be imposed only for the most serious crimes in accordance with the law in
force at the time of the commission of the crime and not contrary to the provisions
of the present Covenant and to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide. This penalty can only be carried out pursuant to a final
judgement rendered by a competent court.
3. When deprivation of life constitutes the crime of genocide, it is understood
that nothing in this article shall authorize any State Party to the present Covenant
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in the European Convention, it already shows the remarkable and rapid
evolution of international law regarding the death penalty. 9 Article 6 of the
International Covenant also includes the death penalty as an exception to the
right to life, but it lists detailed safeguards and restrictions on its implementa-
tion.4" The death penalty may only be imposed for the "most serious crimes,"
it cannot be pronounced unless rigorous procedural rules are respected, and
it may not be applied to pregnant women or to individuals for crimes commit-
ted while under the age of eighteen.4" Furthermore, article 6 of the Inter-
national Covenant clearly points to abolition of the death penalty as a human
rights objective and implies that states that have already abolished the death
penalty may not reintroduce it.42 It too has been amended by an additional
protocol, which was adopted in 1989 and which proclaimed the death penalty
abolished in time of peace and war.43
The second major regional human rights treaty is the American Conven-
tion on Human Rights (American Convention), adopted in 1969 but in force
only since 1978." Here too, the progress is evident. Taking article 6 of the
to derogate in any way from any obligation assumed under the provisions of the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.
4. Anyone sentenced to death shall have the right to seek pardon or commuta-
tion of the sentence. Amnesty, pardon or commutation of the sentence of death
may be granted in all cases.
5. Sentence of death shall not be imposed for crimes committed by persons
below eighteen years of age and shall not be carried out on pregnant women.
6. Nothing in this article shall be invoked to delay or to prevent the abolition




41. See id. For further discussion of article 6 of the International Covenant, see SCHABAS,
supra note 11, at 47-146 (discussing International Covenant); Marc J. Bossuyt, The Death
Penalty in the "travaux prdparatoires" of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, in ESSAIS SUR LE CONCEPT DE "DROIT DE VIVRE": EN MEMOIRE DE YOUGINDRA
KHUSHALANI 251-65 (Daniel Pr~mont ed., 1988) (discussing article 6 of International Cove-
nant); Yoram Dinstein, The Right to Life, Physical Integrity, and Liberty, in THE INTERNA-
TIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS: THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 114-138 (Louis
Henkin ed., 1981) (same); and see also Report of the Human Rights Committee: General Com-
ments under Article 40, paragraph 4 of the Covenant, General Comment 6(16), U.N. GAOR,
37th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 93-94, U.N. Doc. A/37/40 (1982) (discussing right to life).
42. See Report ofthe Human Rights Committee, Kindlerv. Canada (No. 470/1991), U.N.
GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPRIC/48ID/470/1991 (1993) (Wennergren,
dissenting) ("What article 6, paragraph 2, does not, in my view, is to permit States parties that
have abolished the death penalty to reintroduce it at a later stage.").
43. See Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty, supra note 6, art. 1, at 207.
44. See American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 4, at 123; SCHABAS, supra
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International Covenant as a model, the American Convention tightens the
restrictions on the use of the death penalty and affirms explicitly that states
may not reintroduce capital punishment once they have abolished it.4" This
renders the American Convention an abolitionist instrument, to the extent that
ratifying states that have already abolished the death penalty are now bound
as a matter of international law not to use the death penalty. In 1990, an
abolitionist protocol patterned generally on the Second Optional Protocol was
adopted within the inter-American system."
The third major regional treaty is the African Charter of Human and
Peoples' Rights (African Charter),47 adopted in 1981 and in force since 1986.
It too enshrines the right to life, but unlike the European, American and
universal instruments, it makes no mention of capital punishment as an
exception or limitation to this right.4' There is little interpretative material to
assist in construing the African Charter's right to life provision. Some schol-
ars point to African practice, in which a majority of states still employs the
death penalty, and conclude that the African Charter in no way forbids capital
punishment.49 Nevertheless, the African Charter is to be interpreted in light
note 11, at 273-90; ChristinaM. Cema, Universality ofHuman Rights: The Case of the Death
Penalty, 3 ILSAJ. INT'L & CoMP. L. 465,472 (1997); J. Colon-Collazo, A Legislative History
of the Right to Life in the Inter-American Legal System, in THE RIGHT TO LIFE IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 33-41 (B.G. Ramcharan ed., 1985).
45. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has issued two advisory opinions that
interpret this provision. See Advisory Opinion OC-3/83, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 3
(1983), Restrictions to the Death Penalty (Arts. 4(2) and 4(4) of the American Convention on
Human Rights); Advisory Opinion OC-14/94, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 14 (1994),
InternationalResponsibilityfor the Promulgation andEnforcement ofLaws in Violation of the
Convention (Arts. I and2 ofthe American Convention on Human Rights). The Inter-American
Commission of Human Rights has also issued several reports dealing with the death penalty and
the right to life provision of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man. See
Celestine v. United States, Resolution No. 23/89, Case 10,031, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 62, OEA/
ser.L./V./II.77, doe. 7 rev. 1 (1990); Roach and Pinkerton v. United States, Case No. 9647,
Inter-Am. C.H.R. 147, OEA/ser.L.IV./II.71, doe. 9 rev. 1 (1987); see also Christina M. Cema,
US Death Penalty Tested Before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 10 NETH.
Q. HuM. RTs. 155, 155-65 (1992).
46. See Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights to Abolish the Death
Penalty, supra note 6, at 9-11 (abolishing death penalty).
47. African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, art 4, O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3
rev. 5 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1986). For a comment on the right to life provision in the
Affican Charter, see JOHANNES G.C. VANAGGELEN, LEROLEDES ORGANISATIONSINTERNATION-
ALES DANS LA PROTECTIONDUDROrr LA vIE 40-41 (1986).
48. See African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, supra note 47.
49. See Etienne-Richard Mbaya, A la recherche du noyau intangible dans la Charte
africaine, in LE NOYAU INTANGIBLE DES DROITS DEL'HOMME 207-26 (Patrice Meyer-Bisch ed.,
1991); see also KEBA MBAYE, LES DRorrs DE L'HOMME EN AFRIQuE 197 (1992).
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of other international human rights instruments, including "the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights [and] other instruments adopted by the United
Nations. 5o At the very least, then, the restrictions and limitations on the death
penalty found in the International Covenant must apply. Several African
states have already abolished the death penalty,51 the most recent being South
Africa,52 and this will surely influence future interpretation of the African
Charter.53
The recent Arab Charter of Human Rights, adopted September 15, 1994,
but not yet ratified by any members of the League of Arab States, proclaims
the right to life." Three distinct provisions, articles 10, 11, and 12, recognize
the legitimacy of the death penalty in the case of"serious violations of general
law," but prohibit the death penalty for political crimes" and exclude capital
punishment for crimes committed under the age of eighteen and for both
pregnant women and nursing mothers for a period of up to two years follow-
ing childbirth. 6 In international fora such as the United Nations, Arab, and
more generally, Islamic, nations have been among the most aggressive advo-
50. African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, supra note 47, art. 60.
51. See John Hatchard, Capital Punishment in Southern Africa: Some Recent Develop-
ments, 43 INT'L & Corw. L.Q. 923, 923 (1994) (noting that several states have now abolished
death sentence); William A. Schabas, African Perspectives on Abolition of the Death Penalty,
in THEINTERNATIONAL SOURCEBOOKONCAPITALPUNISHMENT30-33 (William A. Schabas ed.,
1997) (same).
52. See The State v. Makwanyane and Mchunu, 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC); see also William
A. Schabas, South Africa's New Constitutional Court Abolishes the Death Penalty, 16 HUM.
RTs. L.J. 133, 133 (1995) (noting that South Africa's Constitutional Court abolished death
penalty). For a literary account of the South African Constitutional Court hearing, see NADINE
GORDImR, THE HOUSE GUN 131-39 (1998).
53. Recently, the Supreme Court of Nigeria heard an application contesting the legality
of the death penalty based inter alia on article 5 of the African Charter. See Nemi v. The State,
[1994] 1 L.R.C. 376,388-89,400 (S.C.N.). The court held that the application was inadmissi-
ble on procedural grounds, but noted that the matter was sure to return to the court in the near
future. 1d. According to Chief Justice Bello, the application has "alerted the court to appreciate
the gravity and constitutional importance of the question. It is anticipated that the occasion for
its determination is likely to be presented soon." Id.
54. See Charte arabe des droits de l'homme, REVUE UNIVERSELLE DES DRoITS DE
L'HOMME 212 (1995).
55. Reynaldo Galindo Pohl, special rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on
Iran, has observed that "there are groups of Islamic legal scholars and practitioners who
recommend the abolition of the death penalty for political crimes on the ground that it is
contrary to Islamic law." See Report on the Human Rights Situation in the Islamic Republic of
Iran by the Special Representative of the Comm 'n on Human Rights, Mr. Reynaldo Galindo
Pohl, pursuant to Commission Resolution 1988/69, U.N. ESCOR, Hum. Rts. Comm'n, 45th
Sess., 26th mtg. § 36, at 12, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1989/26 (1989).
56. See Charte arabe des droits de l'homme, supra note 54, at 212-14.
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cates of retention of the death penalty, defending its use in the name of
obedience to Islamic law and the strictures of the chari'a.57
Observers sometimes cite the right to life provisions of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and those of the regional treaties,
which allow the death penalty as a limitation or exception to the right, in
defense of the affirmation that abolition of the death penalty is not an interna-
tional norm. 8 This is incorrect. Abolition can be deemed an international
norm since at least as early as 1948, if a dynamic interpretation of articles 3
and 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is adopted. 9 By the time
article 6 of the draft International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights was
adopted in 1957, there could be no doubt that abolition of the death penalty
had found its way into positive international human rights law. What would
be an exaggeration at this stage in the development of international human
rights law would be the affirmation that abolition is a universal norm or a
customary norm.
The notion that fundamental rights are subject to limitations is well
accepted inhuman rights law. Generally, such limits exist as a counterbalance
to individual rights and express the collective rights concerns of the commu-
nity as a whole. Thus, for example, prohibitions on hate propaganda consti-
tute limits on freedom of expression that are not only authorized but required
by international law.6' As we have seen, in several instruments, the death
penalty is expressed as a limitation to the right to life. But it is a unique
57. For example, during debate at the 1994 session of the General Assembly, the Suda-
nese delegate noted that "capital punishment was a divine right according to some religions, in
particular Islam.... [C]apital punishment was enshrined in the Koran and millions of inhabit-
ants of the Muslim world believed that it was a teaching of God." U.N. GAOR General Comm.,
49th Sess., 5th mtg. § 13, at 4, U.N. Doc. A/BUR/49ISR.5 (1994); see FRDtRIC SUDRE, DROrr
INTERNATIONAL ET EUROPLEN DES DROITS DE L'HOMMffE 85-87 (1989) (discussing capital
punishment in Islamic law); N. Hosni, Lapeine de mort en droit dgyptien et en droit islamique,
58 REvuEINTERNATIONALEDEDRoITP NAL 407-20 (1987) (same); Tunis Conference Declara-
tion on the Death Penalty in the Legislation of Arab States, in THE INTERNATIONAL
SOURCEBOOK ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 51, at 233-36 (same); A. Wazir, Quelques
aspects de la peine de mort en droit pdnal islamique, 58 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT
P NAL 421-29 (1987) (same).
58. See, e.g., The State v. Makwanyane and Mchunu, 1995 (3) SA 391, 36 (CC)
(Chaskalson, President). According to President Chaskalson, "[c]apital punishment is not
prohibited by public international law, and this is a factor that has to be taken into account in
deciding whether it is cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment within the meaning of section
11(2) [of the interim constitution of South Africa]." Id
59. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 1, arts. 3, 5.
60. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 4, art. 20, § 2,
at 178 (noting prohibition on hate propaganda); International Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Mar. 7, 1966, art. 4(a), 660 U.N.T.S. 195,220 (entered
into force Jan. 4, 1969) (same).
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limitation, born of political compromise rather than respect for collective
rights, and couched in terms that express the desirability of its abolition.
B. The Prohibition of Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading Punishment
The same international legal instruments that protect the right to life also
affirm the prohibition of torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment
or punishment.6 The travauxpriparatoires of these instruments indicate that
their drafters considered that the issue of the death penalty fell within the
context of the right to life, rather than within the issues that are considered
under the rubric of the prohibition of torture or cruel punishment. Yet a literal
reading of the norm leads to the inescapable observation that capital punish-
ment, in that it may be considered "cruel, inhuman or degrading," is a breach
of international norms. While the two norms co-exist in human rights law,
and to the extent that the formulation of the right to life appears to authorize
the death penalty, there is an essential and inevitable tension with a norm that,
at least potentially, may prohibit it. "Cruel" punishment is obviously not a
static notion, as it reflects the "evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society."62 International tribunals recognize that
human rights norms must be interpreted in an evolutive or dynamic manner.63
Therefore, even if the death penalty was not deemed "cruel" in 1948, 1957, or
1969, it may well be today or at some future date.
In 1989, a majority of the European Court of Human Rights stopped short
of concluding that the death penalty constituted cruel, inhuman, and degrading
punishment prohibited by article 3 of the European Convention in Soering v.
United Kingdom.' Amnesty International, which intervened in the Soering
case as an amicus curiae, argued that although article 2 § 1 of the European
Convention authorized capital punishment as an exception to the right to life,
the provision had become inoperative because of the progressively evolving
content of article 3, which prohibits inhuman and degrading punishment.65
The court looked to subsequent state practice for elements that would assist
61. See African Charter of Human and Peoples' Rights, supra note 47, art. 5; American
Convention on Human Rights, supra note 4, art. 5, § 2, at 146; International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, supra note 4, art. 7, at 175; Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 4, art. 3, at 224; Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, supra note 1, art. 5.
62. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
63. See Loizidou v. Turkey, 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) §§ 71-72, at 26-27 (1995) (Prelim-
inary objections).
64. See Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989).
65. Seeid. 8atlO.
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in interpretation.66 As the court noted, during the 1980s, the members of the
Council of Europe had chosen to address the issue of abolition of the death
penalty in the form of an optional or additional protocol to the European
Convention, and not a mandatory or amending protocol. 7 Therefore, the
European Court of Human Rights concluded, it was going too far to suggest
that the European Convention now prohibits the death penalty, despite the
terms of article 2.68 The Strasbourg bench reasoned that, had the Member
States of the Council of Europe sought for the European Convention to evolve
in such a way as to outlaw capital punishment as a form of inhuman and
degrading punishment, contrary to article 3, they would not have proceeded
by an optional protocol.69 Judge Jan de Meyer was alone in adopting a more
radical and dynamic view of the European Convention:
The second sentence of Article 2 § 1 of the Convention [which permits the
death penalty as an exception to the right to life] was adopted, nearly forty
years ago, in particular historical circumstances, shortly after the Second
World War. In so far as it still may seem to permit, under certain condi-
tions, capital punishment in time ofpeace, it does not reflect the contempo-
rary situation, and is now overridden by the development of legal con-
science and practice.
70
Still, the court found a way to apply the prohibition of inhuman and
degrading punishment to the death penalty. The Soering case involved the
threat of extradition to the United States from the United Kingdom of an
individual charged with murder and therefore subject to execution by lethal
injection in the Commonwealth of Virginia.7 It was not the death penalty
itself that the European Court of Human Rights found offensive to the Euro-
pean Convention, but rather the "death row phenomenon," or the years-long
wait for the scaffold under gruesome conditions, both physical and psycholog-
ical.72
66. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 3 l(3)(b), 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, 340 (recognizing role of practice in interpretation).
67. See Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 40-41.
68. See id.
69. See icl at 41.
70. Id. at 51 (de Meyer, J., concurring).
71. See id. at 11-12.
72. Id. at 44-45. See generally John Andrews & Ann Sherlock, Extradition, Death Row
andthe Convention, 15 EUR.L.REv. 87 (1990) (discussing Soering); Henri Labayle, Droits de
l 'homme, traitement inhumain etpeine capitale: Reflexions sur i 'ddification d'un ordre public
europden en matire d'extradition par la Cour europienne des droits de l 'homme, 64 SEMAINE
JURIDIQUE 3452-57 (1990) (same); Richard B. Lillich, The Soering Case, 85 AM.J. INT'LL. 128
(1991) (same); Michael O'Boyle, Extradition and Expulsion under the European Convention
on Human Rights, Reflections on the Soering Case, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL
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The "death row phenomenon" has been one of the most vexing issues to
confront international human rights adjudicative bodies,73 and some of them,
such as the European Court, have been quick to condemn it, while others, such
as the Human Rights Committee, have taken the contrary view.74 The Human
Rights Committee has held that delay in and of itself in implementation of the
death penalty following sentence cannot be termed cruel, inhuman, and de-
grading treatment or punishment.75 This view appears to be altering, perhaps
LAW, ESSAYS IN HoNOuR OF BRIAN WALSH 93-107 (James O'Reilly ed., 1992) (same); John
Quigley & S. Adele Shank, Death Row as a Violation of Human Rights: Is it Illegal to
Extradite to Virginia?, 30 VA. J. INT'L L. 241 (1989) (same); Christine van den Wyngaert,
Applying the European Convention on Human Rights to Extradition: Opening Pandora's
Box?, 39 INT'L &COMP. L.Q. 757 (1990) (same); Colin Warbrick, Coherence andthe European
Court of Human Rights: The Adjudicative Background to the Soering Case, 11 MICH. J. INT'L
L. 1073 (1990) (same); Susan Marks, Comment, Yes, Virginia, Extradition May Breach the
European Convention on Human Rights, 49 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 194 (1990) (same).
73. The issue of the "death row phenomenon" has also been litigated before many domes-
tic courts. For case law on the subject, see Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045, 1045-47 (1995);
Chambers v. Bowersox, No. 97-3067WM, 1998 WL 647289, at *9 (8th Cir. Sept. 23, 1998);
Chessman v. Dickson, 275 F.2d 604, 608 (9th Cir. 1960); Andrews v. Shulsen, 600 F. Supp.
408, 431 (D. Utah 1984), affd, 802 F.2d 1256 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 919
(1988); People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880, 894-95 (Cal. 1972), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 958
(1972); Arsenault v. Commonwealth, 233 N.E.2d 730, 735 (Mass. 1968), rev'd, 393 U.S. 5
(1968); Sher Singh v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 465; RajendraPrasad v. State of Uttar
Pradesh, A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 916; Pratt v. Attorney General for Jamaica, [1994] 2 App. Cas. I
(P.C. 1993) (appeal taken from Jamaica); Riley v. Attorney-General of Jamaica, [1983] App.
Cas. 719 (P.C. 1983) (appeal taken from Jamaica); Catholic Comm'n for Justice and Peace in
Zimbabwe v. Attorney-General, 1993 (4) SA 239 (Z.S.C.); Dhlamini v. Carter N.O., 1968 (2)
SA 445(A); Abbott v. Attorney-General of Trinidad and Tobago, [1979] 1 W.L.R. 1342 (P.C.
1979) (appeal taken from Trinidad and Tobago). Several works discuss the "death row phenom-
enon" in general. See generally STEPHENM. GETrINGER, SENTENCED TO DIE: THE PEOPLE, THE
CRIMES, AND THE CONTROVERSY (1979); BRuCE JACKSON & DIANE CHRISTIAN, DEATH Row
(1980); ROBERT JOHNSON, CONDEMNED TO DIE, LIFE UNDER SENTENCE OF DEATH (1981);
HELEN PREIEAN, DEAD MAN WALKING: AN EYEwITNESS ACCOUNT OF THEDEATH PENALTY IN
THEUNITED STATES (1993); WILLIAMA. SCHABAS, THEDEATH PENALTYAS CRUEL TREATMENT
AND TORTURE 96-156 (1996); Francis Alexis & Margaret De Merieux, Inordinately Delayed
Hanging: Whether an Inhuman Punishment, 29 J. INDIANL. INST. 356,356-79 (1987); Johnnie
L. Gallemore, Jr. & James H. Panton, Inmate Responses to Lengthy Death Row Confinement,
129 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 167, 167-72 (1972); Lloyd Vogelman, The Living Dead: Living on
Death Row, 5 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 183, 183-95 (1989); Nancy Holland, Comment, Death Row
Conditions: Progression Toward Constitutional Protections, 19AKRONL. REV. 293,293-310
(1985).
74. See generally Markus G. Schmidt, The Complementarity of the Covenant and the
European Convention on Human Rights - Recent Developments, in THE INTERNATIONAL
COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS AND UNITED KINGDOM LAW 629-59 (David Harris
& Sarah Joseph eds., 1995).
75. See Report of the Human Rights Committee, Pratt and Morgan v. Jamaica (nos.
210/1986, 225/1987), U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 44th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 280, U.N.
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because of the result of a growing weight of authority from domestic tribunals
that have examined the same question,' as well as a consequence of the chang-
ing composition of the Committee.77 As for the death penalty itself, the Com-
mittee shares the view of the European Court that the death penalty cannot be
deemed "cruel" and therefore contrary to article 7 of the International Cove-
nant, precisely because it is authorized as an exception to the right to life in
article 6.78
Methods of execution may themselves be cruel, inhuman, and degrading.
The Human Rights Committee has affirmed that the use of the gas chamber
in the State of California involves excessive and gratuitous suffering and that
it is therefore contrary to article 7 of the International Covenant.79 But this
puts human rights bodies in the uncomfortable and inappropriate position of
ruling on what is a more humane way to kill an individual.8 The Committee
has since concluded that execution by lethal injection is not cruel, inhuman,
and degrading despite uncontested evidence tendered before it showing that
Doc. A/44140 (1989); Report ofthe Human Rights Committee, Reid v. Jamaica (no. 250/1987),
U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 45th Sess., Supp. No. 40, Vol. 2, at 92, U.N. Doc. A/45/40
(1990); Report ofthe Human Rights Committee, Barrett andSutcliffe v. Jamaica (nos. 270/1988
and 271/1988), U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 47th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 250, U.N. Doc.
A/47/40 (1994); Howard Martin v. Jamaica Communication No. 317/1988 (U.N. Doc. CCPR/
C/47/D/317/1988), 1 INT'L HUM. RTS. REP. 128, § 12.1, at 131 (1994); Report of the Human
Rights Committee, Kindlerv. Canada (No. 470/1991), supra note 42, § 15.2; UN Human Rights
Committee (UN-HRCee), GenevalNew York, Extradition to the United States to Face the
Possible Imposition of the Death Penally Not Considered to Violate the CCPR/Cox v. Canada,
15 HUM. RTS. L.J. 410 (1994) [hereinafter Cox v. Canada].
76. Prattv. Attorney General forJamaica, [199412App. Cas. I (P.C. 1993) (appeal taken
from Jamaica); Catholic Comm'n for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe v. Attorney-General, 1993
(4) SA 239 (Z.S.C.). But see Kindler v. Canada, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 779.
77. See Cox v. Canada, supra note 75, § 17.2, at 417. See also the individual views of
Committee members Hemdl, Sadi, Tamar Ban and Wennergren. Id. at 417-21. In Peart and
Pearl v. Jamaica, the Committee considered assaults of death row inmates to constitute a breach
of article 7. See Peart and Pearl v. Jamaica, Communications Nos. 464/1991 and 482/1991
(U. N. Doc. CCPR/C/54/D/464/1991 and CCPR/C/5 4/D/482/1991), 3 INT'L HUM. RTs. REP. 15,
15-22 (1996). But despite obvious division in its ranks, it has stopped short of endorsing the
European Court's position on the death row phenomenon. See Francis v. Jamaica, Communi-
cation No. 606/1994 (UN. Doc. CCPRIC/54/D/606/1994), 3 INT'L HUM. RTs. REP. 43 (1996).
78. See General Comment 20(44), U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 44th Sess., 1138th
mtg. at 1-4, U.N. Doc. CCPRIC/21/Rev.I/Add.3 (1992).
79. See Gomez v. U.S.- Dist. Ct. for the N. Dist. of Cal., 503 U.S. 653, 654-59 (1992)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing view of United States courts on this question); Report of
the Human Rights Committee, Ngv. Canada, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 49th Sess., Supp.
No. 40, Vol. 2, at 205, U.N. Doc. A/49/40 (1994) (noting that gas chamber is cruel and
inhuman).
80. See Report of the Human Rights Committee, Ng v. Canada, supra note 79, at 220
(noting Christine Chanet's dissenting opinion).
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this more modem and fashionable method of execution also may involve
terrible suffering."
Serious issues of cultural relativism arise in the interpretation of the norm
prohibiting "cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment." The scope of the
three adjectives obviously depends upon value judgments, and these will vary
depending on social and cultural conditions. When Commission on Human
Rights rapporteur Gaspar Biro suggested in February 1994 that the death
penalty as imposed in the Sudan was contrary to articles 6 and 7 of the Inter-
national Covenant,8" his "blasphemy" in attacking "Islamic punishments" was
condemned.83 In fact, however, enthusiasm for the death penalty appears to
cut across cultural lines, as its most aggressive defenders on the international
plane are the United States, China, Singapore, and the Sudan!
C. Customary Norms
Customary international law exists when there is evidence of state
practice accompanied by unequivocal manifestations of policy or opinio
juris.,4 With somewhat less than half of the world's states still employing the
death penalty, it would be too ambitious to assert that abolition is a customary
norm of international law. However, a strong argument can be made that
some or all of the limitations on the use of the death penalty enumerated in
article 6 of the International Covenant have attained the status of customary
law.
The requirement that strict procedural safeguards accompany any capital
trial undoubtedly has become customary international law. The universal
condemnation of summary executions within the human rights bodies of the
United Nations shows that there is unanimity on this point. Moreover, com-
mon article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, often cited as the lowest common
denominator of humane behavior, proscribes "the passing of sentences and the
carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a
regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are
81. Coxv. Canada, supra note 75, § 17.3, at 417.
82. U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n on Hum. Rts., 50th Sess., Agenda Item 12, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1994/48 (1994).
83. See SCHABAS, supra note 73, at 160 (discussing statement by H.E. Mr. Abdelaziz
Shiddo, Minister of Justice and Attorney-General of the Republic of the Sudan and Leader of
Sudan Delegation to the 50th Session ofthe Commission on Human Rights, commenting on the
report of Dr. Gaspar Biro, Special Rapporteur on Human Rights situation in the Sudan under
agenda item 12, Geneva, Feb. 25, 1994); see also U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n on Hum. Rts., 50th
Sess., Agenda Item 12, §§ 58-64, at 18-19, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1994/122 (1994).
84. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, 1989 I.C.J. Acts & Docs. 61,
77 (discussing which law ICJ may apply).
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recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples." 5 The International Court
of Justice has held that common article 3 codifies a customary rule.86
Another customary principle is the prohibition on executions for crimes
committed by young persons. This rule respects an undisputed principle of
criminal law, namely that children have diminished criminal liability due to
their immaturity. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has
stated that there is a customary norm prohibiting executions for juvenile
offenses, although it has stopped short of fixing the minimum age at eight-
een.8" The Commission was only prepared to conclude that a norm setting the
minimum age at eighteen was "emerging."88 More recently, the Human Rights
Committee has suggested a corresponding hesitation in its recent General
Comment on reservations, which affirmed thatthe execution of"children" and
pregnant women was contrary to customary norms, but did not specify the
precise minimum age. 9 Both the International Covenant' and the American
Convention on Human Rights,9 ' as well as the Convention on the Rights of the
Child,92 the fourth Geneva Convention, and its two additional protocols,
however, specify eighteen as the minimum age.93
85. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12,
1949, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 3, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, 136 (entered into force Oct 21, 1950).
86. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
1986 I.C.J. 14, 113-14, 129-30, 148 (June 27) (discussing article 3 and violations thereof); see
also Prosecutor v. Tadic Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Int'l Crim. Tribunal for the Former Yugosla-
via, Appeals Chamber Decision, § 98 (Oct. 2, 1995).
87. See Resolution No. 3/87, Case 9647 (United States) (1987), Inter-Am. C.H.R. 147,
172, OEA/ser.L.N./II.71, doc. 9 rev. 1 (1987).
88. See id.
89. See General CommentNo. 24 (52), U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 52d Sess., 1382d
mtg. § 3, at 2, U.N. Doe. CCPRIC/21/Rev.I/Add.6 (1994).
90. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 4, art. 6(5), at
175.
91. See American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 4, art. 4(5), at 146.
92. See Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 25, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess.,
Supp. No. 49, art. 37, at 171, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989) (noting age limit). But see African
Charter of the Rights and Welfare of the Child, O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990).
However, article 46 states that the African Charter is to be interpreted with an eye to the
universal Convention on the Rights of the Child. See Convention on the Rights of the Child,
supra, art. 46.
93. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War
ofAugust 12, 1949, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 68,75 U.N.T.S. 135 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950)
(noting minimum age of eighteen); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Proto-
col I), June 8, 1977, art. 77, § 5, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 39 (entered into force Dec. 7, 1978) (same);
Protocol Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), June 8, 1977, art. 6,
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When the United States of America ratified the International Covenant
in 1992, it included a reservation to article 6 § 5, which is the provision
concerning juvenile executions.9 Several European states objected that the
reservation was incompatible with the object and purpose of the International
Covenant and therefore invalid.95 The Human Rights Committee, in its
consideration of the initial report by the United States pursuant to article 40
of the International Covenant in March and April 1995, has also concluded
that the reservation is inadmissible. 96 This is a strong argument for the
position that there is a customary norm prohibiting executions for crimes
committed while under eighteen.
D. The Death Penalty in Wartime
Most domestic legislation establishes distinct rules concerning the death
penalty in time of war, when it is employed more frequently and with less
concern for procedural safeguards. This distinction has been carried over into
the abolitionist protocols. In the case of Protocol No. 6 to the European
§ 4, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609, 614 (entered into force Dec. 7, 1978) (same); see also William A.
Schabas, The Death Penalty for Crimes Committed by Persons Under Eighteen Years ofAge,
in MONITORING CHILDREN'S RIGHTS 603-19 (Eugeen Verhellen ed., 1996).
94. See UNITED NATIONS, MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE SECRETARY-
GENERAL, at 132, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/11 (1993).
95. Id. Several works discuss the debate concerning the United States's reservation. See
M.S. Christian Green, The "Matrioshka"Strategy: US Evasion ofthe Spirit ofthe International
Covenant on Civil andPolitical Rights, 10 S. AFR. J.HUM. RTS. 357,357-71 (1994) (discussing
United States's reservations); Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions:
The Ghost of Senator Bricker, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 341, 341-50 (1995) (same); Ved. P. Nanda,
The United States Reservation to the Ban on the Death Penalty for Juvenile Offenders: An
Appraisal under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 42 DEPAuL L. REv.
131, 131-391 (1993) (same); John Quigley, Criminal Law and Human Rights: Implications of
the United States Ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 6
HARv. HUM. RTS. J. 59, 59-86 (1993) (same); William A. Schabas, InvalidReservations to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Is the United States Still a Party?, 21
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 277, 277-325 (1995) (same); William A. Schabas, Les riserves des Etats-
Unis d'Amirique aux articles 6 et 7 du Pacte international relatifaux droits civils etpolitiques,
6 REVUEUNIVERSELLEDES DROITSDEL'HOMME 137, 137-50 (1994) (same); David P. Stewart,
US. Ratification of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: The Significance of the
Reservations, Understandings and Declarations, 14 HUM. RTS. L.J. 77, 77-83 (1993) (same);
Edward F. Sherman, Jr., Comment, The US. Death Penalty Reservation to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Exposing the Limitations of the Flexible System Gov-
erning Treaty Formation, 29 TEX. INT'L L.J. 69, 69-93 (1994) (same).
96. See UNITEDNATIONS, GENERAL ASSEMBLY, HUMANRIGHTS COMMITTEE, CONSIDER-
ATION OF REPORTS SUBMITTED BY STATES PARTIES UNDER ARTICLE 40 OF THE COVENANT,
COMMENTS OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE, § 14, at 3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.50
(1995).
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Convention of Human Rights, execution in wartime is simply excluded from
its scope. The Protocol prohibits the death penalty only in time of peace,
allowing that "[a] State may make provision in its law for the death penalty in
respect of acts committed in time of war or of imminent threat of war."' This
compromise in the drafting process of the first abolitionist treaty reflected the
fact that many European states had abolished capital punishment only in time
of peace.9" Increasingly, however, European states have abolished the death
penalty altogether. The Steering Committee for Human Rights ofthe Council
of Europe is studying the possibility of a draft protocol to the European
Convention that would abolish the death penalty in war as well as in peace.9
The protocol to the International Covenant takes a different approach, outlaw-
ing capital punishment in all circumstances, but allowing states to make a
reservation if they seek to preserve the possibility of imposing the death
penalty in wartime for serious crimes of a military nature.' °° Only one state
party to the Protocol, Spain, has formulated such a reservation.'
The humanitarian law treaties provide specific rules concerning the death
penalty in wartime. Two groups of individuals are contemplated by the legal
rules concerning the death penalty in time of war- combatants taken prisoner
and noncombatant civilians in the hands of a belligerent. The protection of
prisoners of war is governed principally by the third Geneva Convention of
1949 (third Convention). 02 According to the third Convention, prisoners of
war are subject to the laws, regulations, and orders in effect in the armed
forces of the detaining power." If the death penalty is applicable in the laws
of the detaining power, then a prisoner of war may be exposed to the threat of
capital punishment. The third Convention specifically envisions this possibil-
ity in two articles whose aim is to mitigate the rigors of the death penalty and
97. Protocol No. 6 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamen-
tal Freedoms Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty, supra note 6, art. 2, at 2.
98. See Gilbert Guillaume, supra note 35, at 1067-72.
99. See EuR. PARL. Ass. REC. 1246, 25th Sitting (Oct. 4, 1994) <http:llstars.coe.fr/ta/
ta94/erecl246.html>.
100. See Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty, supra note 6, art. 2, at 207. The Protocol
to the American Convention adopts the same approach. See Protocol to the American Conven-
tion on Human Rights to Abolish the Death Penalty, supra note 6, art. 2, at 9.
101. See UNITED NATIONS, GENERAL ASSEMBLY, HUMAN RIGHTS CoMMITrEE, RESERvA-
TIONS, DECLARATIONS, NOTIFICATIONS AND OBJECTIONs RELATING TO THE INTERNATIONAL
COVENANT ON CIvIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS AND THE OPTIONAL PROTOCOLS THERETO, at 101,
U.N. Doc. CCPRIC/2/Rev.3 (1992).
102. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12,
1949, supra note 85, at 135.
103. Id. art. 82, at 200.
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encourage commutation or even exchange of prisoners." These provisions
are a more extensive version of an article in the 1929 Geneva Convention that
protected prisoners of war facing the death penalty."05 Civilians in the hands
of a belligerent were slower to receive comprehensive protection in the
international humanitarian conventions,0 6 but the grave abuses of capital
punishment, mainly by the Nazi occupying forces during World War II,
compelled the elaboration of specific norms in the fourth Geneva Convention
(fourth Convention). 7 The fourth Convention limits the nature of capital
crimes ratione materiae, prohibits the execution of persons for crimes com-
mitted while under the age of eighteen, and establishes a six month morato-
rium on execution after sentencing. 8 It also provides that an occupying
power may never impose the death penalty if it has been abolished under the
laws of the occupied state prior to the hostilities.0 9 The norms in the fourth
Convention have been expanded somewhat by Protocol Additional I, which
prohibits the death penalty for offenses related to armed conflict in the case
of pregnant women or mothers having dependent infants and for offenders
under the age of eighteen at the time of the crime."0 The death penalty
provisions in Protocol Additional II,"' which deals with noninternational
armed conflicts, largely repeat the norms found in article 6 of the International
Covenant and reflect the human rights scope of that instrument. Serious
violations of Protocol Additional II may be prosecuted by the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda."' Arguably, the pronouncement of the death
penalty on persons under the age of eighteen years at the time of the crime
constitutes such an infraction. How ironic it is, then, that the Rwanda Statute
was adopted with the support of the United States, which continues to allow
104. Id. arts. 100, 101, at210-12.
105. See Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, July 27, 1929, art. 66,
118 L.N.T.S. 343, 383 (entered into force June 19, 1931).
106. Some norms protecting civilians appear in the Hague Regulations, although none
address the death penalty. See Convention Regulating the Laws and Customs ofLand Warfare,
Oct. 18, 1907, 2 AM. J. INT'L L. 90, arts. 23, 25, 27, 28, 42-56, at 107-17 (Supp. 1908).
107. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War
of August 12, 1949, supra note 93, arts. 68, 75, at 330, 334-36 (dealing with death penalty).
108. See id.
109. See id. art. 68.
110. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), supra note 93, arts.
76, 77, at 38-39 (discussing protection for women and children).
111. See Protocol Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims ofNon-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), supra
note 93, art. 6, § 4, at 614 (discussing death penalty).
112. See STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA, supra note 5, art. 4.
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sentencing and execution ofjuvenile offenders.
E. International Law and Domestic Courts
The classic weakness of international human rights law is in its means of
implementation. Increasingly, however, international human rights law is
being applied by domestic courts, and this contributes immensely to its
effectiveness. In some countries, it is given primacy over incompatible
domestic legislation. In others, it has been used by courts to assist in inter-
preting the scope of constitutional norms that have usually been inspired by
the international instruments. Death penalty jurisprudence provides one of the
most dramatic examples of this synergy between international and domestic
human rights law.
Courts of several states, including South Africa,"
's Zimbabwe, 1 4
Canada," 5 Tanzania," 6 and the United Kingdom,"7 have found international
law to be particularly helpful in the interpretation of such notions as the right
to life and the prohibition of cruel, inhuman, and degrading punishment. In
a recent judgment of the South African Constitutional Court, which found
capital punishment to be incompatible with the right to life and the protection
against cruel, inhuman, and degrading punishment, President Arthur Chaskal-
son wrote: "The international and foreign authorities are of value because
they analyze arguments for and against the death sentence and show how
courts of otherjurisdictions have dealt with this vexed issue. For that reason
alone they require our attention.""' In writing the decision, he provided a
detailed analysis of the international instruments as well as the case law of
such bodies as the Human Rights Committee and the European Court of
Human Rights.
IM1 International Organizations
As an important human rights issue, the death penalty has been the object
of initiatives within several international organizations, including the United
Nations, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Co-opera-
tion in Europe, and the European Union. Although this activity has not
113. See The State v. Makwanyane and Mchunu, 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC).
114. See Catholic Comm'n for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe v. Attorney-General, 1993
(4) SA 239 (Z.S.C.).
115. See Kindler v. Canada, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 779, 779-82.
116. See Republic v. Mbushuu, [1994] 2 L.R.C. 335 (High Court of Tanzania).
117. See Pratt v. Attorney General for Jamaica, [1994] 2 App. Cas. I (P.C. 1993) (appeal
taken from Jamaica).
118. Makwanyane and Mchunu, 1995 (3) SA 391, § 34.
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always resulted in the creation of positive legal norms, it is a source of "soft
law" and an important reference in the evolution of international custom.
A. The United Nations
In parallel with the drafting of international legal norms found in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, different bodies of the United Nations have been
involved in a variety of initiatives aimed at limiting and eventually abolishing
the death penalty. As a general rule, these have originated in the Commission
on Human Rights and its Sub-Commission and, when there was sufficient
unanimity, resulted in resolutions in the Economic and Social Council and the
General Assembly."9
An early resolution, presented at the 1968 session of the Commission on
Human Rights, observed that "the major trend among experts and practitioners
in the field is towards the abolition of capital punishment."' 20 It cited a series
of safeguards respecting appeal, pardon, and reprieve and mandated delay of
execution until the exhaustion of such procedures. It invited governments to
provide for a six month moratorium before implementing the death penalty.'
In the General Assembly, many retentionist states even supported the draft
resolution, noting that it confined itself to the "humanitarian" aspect of the
question, 22 although more militant abolitionist states criticized its timidity,
saying it would not "induce Governments to abolish the death penalty.""m The
119. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 1396, U.N. GAOR, 14th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 23, U.N. Doc.
A/4354 (1960); G.A. Res. 2392, U.N. GAOR, 23d Sess., Supp. No. 18, at4l, U.N. Doc. A17218
(1968); G.A. Res. 2857, U.N. GAOR, 26th Sess., Supp. No. 29, at 94, U.N. Doc. A/8429
(1972); G.A. Res. 3011, U.N. GAOR, 27th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 67, U.N. Doc. A/8730
(1973); G.A. Res. 61, U.N. GAOR, 32d Sess., Supp. No.45, at 136, U.N. Doc. A/32/45 (1978);
G.A. Res. 59, U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 36th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 174, U.N. Doc. A/36/51
(1981); G.A. Res. 192, U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 37th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at209-10, U.N. Doc.
A/37/51 (1982); G.A. Res. 137, U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 226, U.N.
Doc. A/39/51 (1984); E.S.C. Res. 934, U.N. ESCOR, 35th Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 5, U.N. Doc.
E/3753 (1963); E.S.C. Res. 1574, U.N. ESCOR, 50th Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 7, U.N. Doc.
E/5044 (1971); E.S.C. Res. 1656, U.N. ESCOR, 52d Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 1, U.N. Doc. E/5183
(1972); E.S.C. Res. 1745, U.N. ESCOR, 54th Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 4, U.N. Doc. E/5367
(1973); E.S.C. Res. 1930, U.N. ESCOR, 58th Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 35, U.N. Doc. E/5683
(1975).
120. Cf U.N. ESCOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 4, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/972 (1968).
121. See id. at 134-36, 162-64.
122. See U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 23d Sess., 1557th mtg. § 17, at 3, U.N. Doc. AIC.3/
SR.1557 (1968) (China); U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 23d Sess., 1558th mtg. § 10, at 2, U.N. Doc.
A/C.3/SR.1558 (1968) (France).
123. U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 23d Sess., 1558th mtg. § 2, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1558
(1968) (Austria).
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Commission's resolution, with some minor amendments, was then adopted by
the General Assembly.'24 A few years later, an Assembly resolution declared
that "the main objective to be pursued is that of progressively restricting the
number of offences for which capital punishment may be imposed, with a
view to the desirability of abolishing the punishment in all countries."'"
The United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and Control, held
every five years, has also provided a forum for debate on the death penalty.
In 1975, the Congress successfully resisted attempts by nongovernmental
organizations 26 to raise the issue of capital punishment at its Geneva session
because the issue was not on the agenda. 27 At the Sixth United Nations
Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, held in
1980 in Caracas, more time was devoted to the issue of capital punishment
than to any other question.' A draft resolution called for restriction and
eventual abolition of the death penalty and added that abolition would be "a
significant contribution to the strengthening of human rights, in particular the
right to life."'29 A controversial provision urged states that had not abolished
capital punishment to "consider establishing a moratorium in its application,
or creating other conditions under which capital punishment is not imposed
or is not executed, so as to permit those states to study the effects of abolition
on a provisional basis."'3 ° But faced with some stiff opposition and inade-
quate time to complete the discussions, the sponsors withdrew the revised
draft resolution.'' At the 1990 Congress held in Havana, a resolution on
124. See G.A. Res. 2393, U.N. GAOR, 23d Sess., Supp. No. 18, at 41-42, U.N. Doc.
A/7218 (1968); U.N. GAOR, 23d Sess., 1727thplen. mtg. at 15, U.N. Doc. A/PV.1727 (1968)
(adopted by ninety-four votes to zero, with three abstentions); U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 23d
Sess., 1559th mtg. § 34, at 3-4, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1559 (1968) (adoption in Third Commit-
tee).
125. G.A. Res. 2857, U.N. GAOR, 26th Sess., Supp. No. 29, at 94, U.N. Doc. A/8429
(1972).
126. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT: THE DEATH
PENALTY 33 n.7 (1979).
127. See UNITED NATIONS, GENERAL ASSEMBLY, FIFTH UNITED NATIONS CONGRESS ON
THE PREVENTION OF CRIME AND THE TREATMENT OF OFFENDERS, PROVISIONAL AGENDA AND
ORGANIZATION OF WORK, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.56/l/Rev.1 (1975).
128. See U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 35th Sess., 73d mtg. § 40, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/35/SR.74
(1980) (recording comments of Chief, Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Branch).
129. See UNITED NATIONS, GENERAL ASSEMBLY, SIXTH UNITED NATIONS CONGRESS ON
THE PREVENTION OF CRIME AND THE TREATMENT OF OFFENDERS, DRAFT RESOLUTION SuBMIT-
TED BYAUSTRIA, ECUADOR, THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY AND SWEDEN, at 58-60, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.87/14/Rev.1 (1980).
130. See id. at 59.
13 1. See id. at 51-52; see also Roger S. Clark, Human Rights and the U.N. Committee on
Crime Prevention and Control, 506 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. Sci. 68,75 (1989) (noting
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capital punishment was proposed that returned to the idea of a moratorium on
the death penalty, "at least on a three year basis."' The resolution was
adopted in Committee by forty votes to twenty-one, with sixteen abstentions,
but was rejected in plenary session because it failed to obtain a two-thirds
majority.
33
The Safeguards Guaranteeing Protection of the Rights of those Facing the
Death Penalty were drafted by the Committee on Crime Prevention and
Control (the Commission) 34 at its March 1984 session. 35 The safeguards
expand upon the restrictions on use of the death penalty found in article 6 of
the International Covenant. They specify that use of capital punishment must
be confined to "intentional crimes, with lethal or other extremely grave
consequences." 136 With respect to categories of persons excluded from the
death penalty, they add "new mothers" and "persons who have become in-
sane" to juvenile offenders and pregnant women, who were already expressly
protected by article 6 § 5 of the International Covenant.137 The death penalty
can only be imposed "when the guilt of the person charged is based upon clear
and convincing evidence leaving no room for an alternative explanation of the
facts."'' The safeguards were later endorsed in resolutions by the Economic
and Social Council, 139 the General Assembly, 14' and the Seventh United
Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders,
held in Milan in 1985.Y In 1988, the safeguards were themselves strength-
lack of consensus). -
132. See Roger S. Clark, The Eighth UnitedNations Congress on the Prevention of Crime
and the Treatment of Offenders, Havana, Cuba, August 27-September 7, 1990, 1 CRIM. L.F.
513, 518 (1990) (citation omitted).
133. See UNITED NATIONS, GENERAL ASSEMBLY, REPORT OF THE EIGHT UNITEDNATIONS
CONGRESS ON THE PREVENTION OF CRIME AND THE TREATMENT OF OFFENDERS, §§ 350, 358,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1 (1990); see also Clark, supra note 132, at 513-48.
134. ROGER S. CLARK, THE UNITED NATIONS CRIME PREVENTION AND CRIMINAL JusTICE
PROGRAM, FORMULATION OF STANDARDS AND EFFORTS AT THEIR IMPLEMENTATION 58-62
(1994) (discussing the Commission).
135. See Draft resolution VII: Safeguards Guaranteeing Protection ofthe Rights of those
Facing the Death Penalty, U.N. ESCOR, 8th Sess., Supp. No. 6, at 19-21, U.N. Doc. E1i 984/16
(1984) (outlining safeguards).
136. Id. at 21.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. See UNITEDNATIONS, ECONOMICAND SocIAL COUNCIL, SAFEGUARDS GUARANTEEING
PROTECTION OF THE RIGHTS OF THOSE FACING THE DEATH PENALTY, E.S.C. Res. 1984/50
(1984). This resolution was adopted without a vote.
140. See G.A. Res. 118, U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, § 79, at 211,
U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984) (endorsing safeguards).
141. See UNITED NATIONS, GENERAL ASSEMBLY, SEVENTH UNITED NATIONS CONGRESS
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ened by a new resolution of the Committee on Crime Prevention and Control,
which addressed additional matters, such as the prohibition of execution of the
mentally handicapped. 42
In 1994, at the forty-ninth session, a General Assembly draft resolution
called for a moratorium on the death penalty.1 43 The resolution originated
from a newly-formed nongovernmental organization, "Hands Off Cain - the
International League for Abolition of the Death Penalty Before the Year
2000," which had obtained the support of the Italian Parliament for the draft
resolution. A series of preambular paragraphs referred to earlier General
Assembly resolutions on the death penalty, the 1984 safeguards, relevant
provisions in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the Convention on the Rights of
the Child, the statutes of the ad hoe criminal tribunals for the former Yugosla-
via and Rwanda, and the draft statute of the proposed International Criminal
Court.'" The first of three dispositive paragraphs invited states that still
maintain the death penalty to comply with their obligations under the Interna-
tional Covenant and the Convention on the Rights of the Child and, in particu-
lar, to exclude pregnant women and juveniles from execution. 4 The second
paragraph invited states that had not abolished the death penalty to consider
the progressive restriction of the number of offences for which the death
penalty may be imposed and to exclude the insane from capital punishment.'46
The final paragraph
encourage[d] all States that have not yet abolished the death penalty to
considerthe opportunity ofinstituting amoratorium on pending executions
with a view to ensuring that the principle that no State should dispose of
the life of any human being be affmned in every part of the world by the
year 2000."4
ONTHEPREVENTIONOF CRIMEAND THETREATMENT OF OFFENDERS, MILAN, ITALY, 26 AUGUST-
6 SEPTEMBER1985, REPORTBYTHE SECRETARIAT, at 83-84, 131-32, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.121/
22/Rev.1 (1986); see also UNITED NATIONS, EcONOmc AND SociAL COUNCIL, IMPLEMENTA-
TION OF THE SAFEGUARDS GUARANTEEING PROTEcTON OF THE RIGHTS OF THOSE FACING THE
DEATHPENALTY,E.S.C. Res. 1989/64 (1989) (providing follow-up on the "Safeguards"). This
resolution was adopted without a vote. Id.
142. See E.S.C. Res. 1989/64, supra note 141.
143. See U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., at 1-4, U.N. Doc. A/49/234 (1994), A/49/234/Add.1,
A/49/234/Add.2, amendedbyU.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 49th Sess., at 1-2, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/49/
L.32/Rev.1 (1994).
144. See id. at l-2.
145. See id. at 2.
146. See id
147. See id.
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Italy eventually obtained forty-nine cosponsors for the resolution. '48 How-
ever, Singapore was able to obtain the support of several retentionist states
and, with a procedural gambit, succeeded in blocking adoption of the resolu-
tion. 49
Capital punishment returned to the United Nations agenda at the 1996
session of the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, which
considered a draft resolution entitled "Safeguards Guaranteeing Protection of
the Rights of Those Facing the Death Penalty." 5' The 1996 resolution calls
upon Member States in which the death penalty has not been abolished to
apply effectively the safeguards guaranteeing protection of the rights of those
facing the death penalty, to ensure that each defendant facing a possible death
penalty is given all guarantees to ensure a fair trial, to ensure that defendants
who do not sufficiently understand the language used in court are fully in-
formed by way of interpretation or translation of all the charges against them
and the content of the relevant evidence deliberated in court, to allow ade-
quate time for the preparation of appeals and for the completion of appeals
proceedings as well as for petitions for clemency, to ensure that officials
involved in decisions to carry out an execution are fully informed of the status
of appeals and petitions for clemency of the prisoner in question, and to
effectively apply the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Pris-
oners"' in order to keep the suffering of prisoners under sentence of death to
a minimum and to avoid any exacerbation of such suffering.'52 The resolution
was subsequently endorsed by the Economic and Social Council.'
Italy recovered from the frustration of the 1994 General Assembly and
presented a resolution to the 1997 session of the Commission on Human Rights
148. See SCHABAS, supra note 11, at 187 n.314 (listing Andorra, Argentina, Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Cambodia, Cape Verde, Chile, Colombia, CostaRica, Cyprus, Czech
Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta,
Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Monaco, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay,
Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Sao Tomd and Principe, Slovak Republic, Solomon Islands,
Spain, Sweden, Uruguay, Vanuatu, and Venezuela as co-sponsors for resolution).
149. See U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 49th Sess., 61st mtg. at 13, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/49/SR.61
(1994).
150. Cf UNITEDNATIONS, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, SAFEGUARDS GUARANTEEING
PROTECTION OF RIGHTS OF THOSE FACING THE DEATH PENALTY, E.S.C. Res. 1996/15 (1996).
151. E.S.C. Res. 663(C), U.N. ESCOR, 24th Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 11, U.N. Doc. E/3048
(1957), amended by E.S.C. Res. 2076, U.N. ESCOR, 62d Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 35, U.N. Doc.
E/5988 (1977); see CLARK, supra note 134, at 145-79 (discussing Standard Minimum Rules).
152. Cf. SAFEGUARDS GUARANTEEING PROTECTION OF RIGHTS OF THOSE FACING THE
DEATH PENALTY, supra note 150.
153. See id.
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calling for, inter alia, a moratorium on the death penalty."' The preamble
refers to the right to life provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the
Convention on the Rights of the Child, as well as relevant resolutions of the
General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council."'5 It notes deep
concern that several countries impose the death penalty in disregard of the
limitations provided for in the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, as well as the safe-
guards promoted to guarantee the protection of the rights of those facing the
death penalty. 6 The resolution states the Commission's conviction "that
abolition of the death penalty contributes to the enhancement of human dig-
nity and to the progressive development of human rights.'0
5 7
In its operative paragraphs, it calls for accession or ratification of the
Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, aiming at the abolition of the death penalty.' States that still main-
tain the death penalty are urged to comply fully with their obligations under
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention
on the Rights of the Child, notably, not to impose the death penalty for any but
the most serious crimes, not to impose it for crimes committed by persons
below eighteen years of age, to exclude pregnant women from capital punish-
ment, and to ensure the right to seek pardon or commutation of sentence. 9
It requests states to consider suspending executions and imposing a morato-
rium on the death penalty. 6 The resolution was passed by a roll-call vote,
twenty-seven in favor and eleven opposed, with fourteen abstaining.'6 The
154. See U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n on Hum. Rts., 53d Sess., Agenda Item 14, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1997/L.20 (1997).
155. Id. at 1.





161. See UNITED NATIONs, COMMIsSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS APPROVES MEASUREs ON
ABOLITION OF DEATH PENALTY, PROTECTION OF MIGRANT WORKERS, MINORITIES, at 3, U.N.
Doc. HR/CN/789 (1997). The resolution is recorded as 1997/12. The following countries were
in favor of the resolution: Angola, Argentina, Austria, Belarus, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Cape
Verde, Chile, Colombia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy,
Mexico, Mozambique, Nepal,.Netherlands, Nicaragua, Russian Federation, South Africa,
Ukraine, and Uruguay. Id. at 4. The following countries were against the resolution: Algeria,
Bangladesh, Bhutan, China, Egypt, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Pakistan, Republic of Korea,
and United States of America. Id. The following countries abstained from the vote on the
resolution: Benin, Cuba, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Gabon, Guinea, India, Madagascar, Philippines,
Sri Lanka, Uganda, United Kingdom, Zaire, and Zimbabwe. Id.
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terms of the 1997 resolution require that the matter return to the Commission
agenda in 1998.
Although the Commission on Human Rights has not designated a special
rapporteur with specific responsibility for capital punishment, its special rap-
porteur on extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary executions, Senegalese lawyer
Bacre WalyNdiaye, has taken a considerable interest in the subject and clearly
views it as part of his mandate. In his 1997 annual report to the Commission
on Human Rights, Ndiaye set forth his views on the desirability of abolishing
the death penalty. He stated that "given that the loss of life is irreparable...
the abolition of capital punishment is most desirable in order fully to respect
the right to life."'62 He added that when "there is a fundamental right to life,
there is no right to capital punishment."'63
In his report, Ndiaye noted such positive developments as the abolition
of the death penalty by Belgium in July 1996.16' He expressed concern about
the expansion of the scope of the death penalty in Estonia and Libya and
regretted the fact that some states resumed executions after a lull of many
years, notably Bahrain, Comoros, Guatemala, Thailand, and Zimbabwe.'65
The special rapporteur referred to the importance of maintaining the highest
procedural standards in capital trials, including public hearings. 6 6 Ndiaye
was disturbed by reports that the death penalty was imposed in secrecy in
some countries, such as Belarus, China, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. Ndiaye
noted that:
As in previous years, the Special Rapporteur received numerous reports
indicating that in some cases the practice of capital punishment in the
United States does not conform to a number of safeguards and guarantees
contained in international instruments relating to the rights of those facing
the death penalty. The imposition of the death penalty on mentally retarded
persons, the lack of adequate defence, the absence of obligatory appeals
162. Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions: Report of the Special Rapporteur,
U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n on Hum. Rts., 53d Sess., Agenda Item 10, § 79, at 22, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1997/60 (1996).
163. See id. § 73, at 20; see also UNITED NATIONS, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL,
COMM'N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, 52ND SEss., ITEM 10 OF THE PROVISIONAL AGENDA, QUESTION OF
THE VIOLATION OF HUMANRiGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS INANY PART OF THE WORLD,
WITH PARTICULARREFERENCETO COLONIAL AND OTHERDEPENDENT COUNTRIES AND TERRITO-
RIES, EXTRAJUDICIAL, SUMmARY ORARBITRARY EXECUTIONS, REPORTBYTHE SPECIAL RAPPOR-
TEUR, MR. BACRE WALY NDIAYE, SUBMITrED PURSUANT TO COMMIssION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
RESOLUTION 1995/73, §§ 507-17, 540-57, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1996/4 (1996) <http:/www.
unhchr.ch/html/menu4/chrrep/496.htm>.
164. See Extrajudicial, Summary orArbitrary Executions: Report ofthe Special Rappor-
teur, supra note 162, at 22.
165. See id. at 21.
166. See id. at 22.
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and racial bias continue to be the main concerns.167
In his report, he also stated that:
[le] remains deeply concerned that death sentences continue to be handed
down after trials which allegedly fall short of the international guarantees
for a fair trial, including lack of adequate defence during the trials and
appeals procedures. An issue of special concern to the Special Rapporteur
remains the imposition and application of the death penalty on persons
reported to be mentally retarded or mentally ill. Moreover, the Special
Rapporteur continues to be concerned about those cases which were
allegedly tainted by racial bias on the part of the judges or prosecution and
about the non-mandatory nature of the appeals procedure after conviction
in capital cases in some states. 6
Throughout 1996, the special rapporteur sent urgent appeals to the United
States of America concerning death sentences imposed on the mentally
retarded in cases following trial in which the right to an adequate defense had
allegedly not been fully ensured, in which individuals had been sentenced to
death without resorting to their right to lodge any legal or clemency appeal,
and in which they had been sentenced to death despite strong indications
casting doubt on their guilt.169 Ndiaye sent a special appeal to the United
States in the case of Joseph Roger O'Dell who, according to his report to the
Commission on Human Rights, "ha[d] reportedly extraordinary proof of inno-
cence which could not be considered because the law of the State of Virginia
does not allow new evidence into court 21 days after conviction.1 71 *Despite
an international campaign, O'Dell was executed in July 1997. Ndiaye also
noted that, in response to his urgent appeals, the United States government
provided nothing more than a reply in the form of a description of the legal
safeguards provided to defendants in the United States in criminal cases. 7'
Ndiaye had inquired on several occasions as to whether the United States
would "consider extending him an invitation to carry out an on-site visit."
172
As a result of repeated initiatives, on October 17, 1996, he received a written
invitation from the government to visit the United States and conduct his
investigation.173 In October 1997, Special RapporteurNdiaye conducted atwo
167. Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions: Report of the Special Rapporteur,
U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n on Hum. Rts., 53rd Sess., Agenda Item 10, § 543, at 127, U.N. Doc.
EICN.4/1997/601Add.1 (1996).
168. Id. § 551, at 130.
169. Id. § 544, at 127-28.
170. Id.
171. Id. § 546, at 129.
172. Id. §§ 547, 548, at 129.
173. Id. §549, at130.
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week mission to the United States, where he attempted to visit death row
prisoners in Florida, Texas, and California. At California's San Quentin
Penitentiary, he was refused permission by authorities to meet with designated
prisoners. Ndiaye's visit provoked the ire of Senator Jesse Helms, chair of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, who in a letter to William Richardson,
United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations, described the
mission as an "an absurd U.N. charade."174 Senator Helms asked, "Bill, is this
man confusing the United States with some other country or is this an inten-
tional insult to the United States and to our nation's legal system?"'75 Ndiaye
replied: "I am very surprised that a country that is usually so open and has been
helpful to me on other missions, such as my attempts to investigate human
rights abuses in the Congo, should consider my visit an insult."'76
B. Council of Europe
The Council of Europe, now composed of forty Member States covering
virtually all of the European continent as well as much of northern Asia, was
the first regional system to incorporate a fully abolitionist international norm
when, in 1983, it adopted Protocol No. 6 to the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Concerning the Abolition of the
Death Penalty. 77 In 1994, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of
Europe adopted a resolution calling upon Member States that had not yet done
so to ratify Protocol No. 6.178 The resolution praised Greece, which in 1993
had abolished the death penalty for crimes committed in wartime as well as
in peacetime. It stated:
In view of the irrefutable arguments against the imposition of capital pun-
ishment, it calls on the parliaments of all member states of the Council of
Europe, and of all states whose legislative assemblies enjoy special guest
status at the Assembly, which retain capital punishment for crimes com-
mitted in peacetime and/or in wartime, to strike it from their statute books
completely.1
79
It urged all heads of state and all parliaments in whose countries death sen-
174. John M. Goshko, Helms Calls Death Row Probe "Absurd U.N. Charade"; Senate
Foreign Affairs ChiefDemands Explanation ofRights Investigation From U.S. Envoy, WASH.
POST, Oct. 8, 1997, at A07.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Protocol No. 6 to the Convention for the Protection offHuman Rights and Fundamen-
tal Freedoms Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty, supra note 6.
178. See EuR. PARL. Ass. Ras. 1044,25th Sitting (Oct. 4,1994) <http'//stars.coe.fr/ta/ta94/
eres1044.html>; see also Report of the Comm. on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, EUR. PARL.
Ass., 25th Sitting, Doc. No. 7154 (1994).
179. See EUR. PARL. Ass. RES. 1044, supra note 178, § 3.
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tences are passed to grant clemency to those convicted and subject to the
death penalty.' It also affirmed that willingness to ratify Protocol No. 6 be
made a prerequisite for membership of the Council of Europe."' Signifi-
cantly, in the Dayton Peace Agreement, signed at Paris on December 14,
1995, the new state of Bosnia and Herzegovina was held to the highest stan-
dard ofcompliance with contemporary human rights norms, including ratifica-
tion of Protocol No. 6 and the incorporation of its terms as the fundamental
law of the new republic.' 2
The Parliamentary Assembly also adopted a "recommendation" that
deplored the fact that the death penalty was still provided by law in eleven
Council of Europe Member States and seven states whose legislative assem-
blies have special status with respect to the organization. 3 An indication that
the death penalty is far from a theoretical issue in Europe, it expressed shock
that 59 people were legally put to death in those states in 1993 and that at least
575 prisoners were known currently to be awaiting their execution. The
Assembly said that application of the death penalty "may well be compared
with torture and be seen as inhuman and degrading punishment within the
meaning of article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights."' 84 It
recommended that the Committee of Ministers draft an additional protocol to
the European Convention on Human Rights, abolishing the death penalty both
in peace and wartime, and obliging the parties not to reintroduce it under any
circumstances.' The recommendation also proposed establishing a control
mechanism that would oblige states in which the death penalty is still pro-
vided by law to set up commissions with a view to abolishing capital punish-
ment. 6 A moratorium would be declared on all executions while the com-
missions fulfill their tasks.' The commissions would be required to notify
the Secretary General of the Council of Europe of any death sentences passed
and any executions scheduled without delay. 8 Any country that had sched-
180. See id. § 8.
181. See id. § 5.
182. General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Annex 4:
Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, art. II, § 2 <http:llwww.state.gov/www/regions/eur/
bosnialdayann4.html>; General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Annex 6: Agreement on Human Rights, art. 1 <http:llwww.state.gov/www/regions/eur/bosnia/
dayann6.html>.
183. See EuR. PARL. Ass. REC. 1246, supra note 99, § 1.
184. Id.§3.
185. Id. § 6(i).
186. Id. § 6(i).
187. Id. § 6(ii)(c).
188. Id. § 6(ii)(d).
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uled an execution would be required to halt it for a period of six months from
the time of notification of the Secretary General.'89 During this time the
Secretary General would be empowered to send a delegation to conduct an
investigation and make a recommendation to the country concerned."'° Finally,
all states would be bound not to allow the extradition of any person to a
country in which the person risked being sentenced to death and subjected to
the extreme conditions on "death row." 191
The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, in a January 1996
interim reply, indicated that the proposals of the Parliamentary Assembly were
being examined. The Parliamentary Assembly adopted a new recommenda-
tion on June 28, 1996 calling for the Committee of Ministers to follow up on
the 1994 proposals without delay.192 On June 28, 1996, the Parliamentary
Assembly adopted a resolution reaffirming its opposition to the death pen-
alty. 93 The Assembly declared that all states joining the Council of Europe
must impose a moratorium on executions, without delay, and indicate their
willingness to ratify Protocol No. 6.9' The resolution added that
the Assembly reminds applicant states to the Council of Europe that the
willingness to sign and ratify Protocol No. 6 of the European Convention
on Human Rights and to introduce a moratorium upon accession has
become a prerequisite for membership of the Council of Europe on the part
of the Assembly. 195
Resolution 1097 was also an answer to reports that the Russian Federation and
Ukraine, which had recently joined the Council of Europe, were not honoring
their commitments. The Resolution condemned Ukraine "for apparently vio-
lating its commitments to introduce a moratorium on executions of the death
penalty upon its accession to the Council of Europe."'96 As for Russia, the
Parliamentary Assembly demanded that it respect the Assembly's undertak-
ings to stop all executions. 97 The resolution stated that further executions
could imperil the continued membership of the two states in the Council of
Europe. 98 The Assembly extended its warning to Latvia, where apparently
189. Id. § 6(ii)(e).
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. See EuR. PARL. Ass. REc. 1302, § 3,24th Sitting (June 28, 1996) <http://stars.coe.fr/
ta/ta96/erecl302.html>.
193. See EuR. PARL. Ass. RaS. 1097, 24th Sitting (June 28, 1996) <http://stars.coe.fr/taf
ta96/eres1097.html>.
194. See id. § 6.
195. Id.
196. Id. § 2.
197. Id.§3.
198. Id. § 4.
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two executions had been carried out since it joined the Council. 9 Amnesty
International has reportedthat in 1996 Ukraine carried out 167 executions and
Russia carried out 140 executions, putting the two states at the top of the list
for executions world-wide, with the exception of China, whose title to first
place in the standings has been undisputed for many years.200 In order to
advance the debate within Ukraine, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Coun-
cil of Europe held a seminar on the abolition of the death penalty in Kiev on
November 28-29, 1996 at which international experts debated the issues with
members of the Ukrainian judicial community.2"'
Since then, Russia and Ukraine signed Protocol No. 6, on April 17, 1997
and May 5, 1997, respectively. These states must still ratify the instrument,
although pursuant to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties:
A State is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and
purpose of a treaty when:
(a) it has signed the treaty or has exchanged instruments constituting the
treaty subject to ratification, acceptance or approval, until it shall have
made its intention clear not to become a party to the treaty . .202
It appears that the Russian Federation has, in effect, respected the moratorium
and that executions have stopped.20 3 The evidence from Ukraine is more
ambiguous.
On October 11, 1997, at the Second Summit of the Council of Europe,
the Heads of State and Government of the Council of Europe adopted a series
of declarations, including one dealing with capital punishment.2 "' In their
declarations to the Summit, several ofthe leaders insistedupon the importance
of abolition of the death penalty as one of the central human rights goals of
the Council. These included Romano Prodi of Italy,2"5 Jean-Claude Juncker
199. Id.§2.
200. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, The Death Penalty World-Wide: Developments in
1996, Al Index: ACT/50/05197, June 1997.
201. Seminar on the Abolition of the Death Penalty, The Cruelty of the Death Penalty:
Capital Punishment and Human Rights, EUR. PARL. ASS., Doc. No. AS/Jur 72 (1996).
202. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 18(a), 1155 U.N.T.S.
331, 336 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980).
203. The Committee Against Torture recently urged Ukraine to make its moratorium on
the death penalty permanent. See UN=rED NATIONS, COMMITTEE AGAINST TORTURE CON-
CLUDES EIGHTEENTH SESSION IN GENEVA, 28 APRIL-9 MAY, at 2, U.N. Doc. HR/4326 (1997).
204. See Council of Europe, SecondSummit ofthe Council ofEurope, 10-11 October 1997
inStrasbourg: FinalDeclaration<http://www.coe.fr/summittedeclplan.htm> [hereinafiterFinal
Declaration].
205. See Council of Europe, SecondSummit ofthe Council ofEurope, 10-11 October 1997
in Slrasbourg: Statement by Mr. Romano Prodi, President of the Council ofMinisters ofItaly
<http://www.coe.fr/summit/discours/eprodi.htm>.
55 WASH. & LEE L. REV 797 (1998)
of Luxembourg," 6 Alfred Sant of Malta, 7 and Poul Nyrup Rasmussen of
Denmark.2" 8 Russian president Boris Yeltsin announced: "Russia has intro-
duced a moratorium on capital punishment and we are strictly complying with
this undertaking. I know that the European public opinion was shocked by
public executions in Chechnya. Russia's leadership is taking all necessary
measures to contain such manifestations of medieval barbarity. "20 9 The Presi-
dent of Latvia, Guntis Ulmanis, explained that a year earlier, he had imposed
a moratorium on executions, and that it is still in force.210 In the Final Decla-
ration of the Summit, the heads of state and government "call[ed] for the
universal abolition of the death penalty and insist[ed] on the maintenance, in
the meantime, of existing moratoria on executions in Europe."2"'
C. European Union
Death penalty issues have frequently been raised within the European
Parliament, which has adopted a number of resolutions on the subject over the
years. As early as 1981, a resolution called for abolition of the death penalty
in the European Community. 2 Following the coming into force of Protocol
No. 6, the European Parliament urged Member States to ratify that abolitionist
instrument. 3 In 1989, the European Parliament adopted the "Declaration of
Fundamental Rights and Freedoms," which proclaims the abolition of the
death penalty." 4 In 1990, the president of the European Parliament an-
206. See Council of Europe, SecondSummit ofthe Council ofEurope, 10-11 October 1997
in Strasbourg: Statement by Mr. Jean-Claude Juncker, Prime Minister ofLuxembourg <http:ll
www.coe.fr/summit/discours/elux.htm>.
207. See Council of Europe, SecondSummit ofthe Council ofEurope, 10-11 October 1997
in Strasbourg: Statement by Mr. Alfred Sant, Prime Minister of Malta <http://www.coe.frl
summit/discours/emalta.htm>.
208. See Council ofEurope, SecondSummit ofthe Council ofEurope, 10-11 October1997
in Strasbourg: Statement by Mr. Poul Nyrup Rasmussen, Prime Minister ofDenmark <http://
www.coe.fr/summit/discours/edk.htm>.
209. See Council of Europe, Second Summit ofthe Council ofEurope, 10-11 October 1997
in Strasbourg: Statement by Mr. Boris Yeltsin, President of the Russian Federation <http://
www.coe.fr/summit/discours/erussia.htm>.
210. See Council ofEurope, SecondSummit ofthe Council ofEurope, 10-11 October 1997
in Strasbourg: Statement by Mr. Guntis Ulmanis, President of the Republic ofLatvia <http:/l
www.coe.fr/summit/discours/elatvia.htm>.
211. See Final Declaration, supra note 204.
212. See SCHABAS, supra note 11, at 258 (discussing abolition of death penalty in Euro-
pean Union) (footnote omitted).
213. See E.C. Doc. A2-167/85; 1986 O.J. (C36) 214-15.
214. See SCHABAS, supra note 11, at 259 (discussing abolition of death penalty in Euro-
pean Union) (footnote omitted).
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nounced that he had forwarded a motion for a resolution on abolition of the
death penalty in the United States."a Subsequently, the Political Affairs
Committee decided to prepare a report on the death penalty and appointed
Maria Adelaide Aglietta as rapporteur. In 1992, a motion for a resolution was
prepared that named those European Union states, namely Greece, Belgium,
Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom, whose legislation still provided for the
death penalty in the case of exceptional crimes, to abolish it altogether.2" 6 It
also urged all member states that had not yet done so to ratify Protocol No. 6
as well as the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights.2" 7 The resolution also called upon member states to
refuse extradition to states where capital punishment still exists, unless suffi-
cient guarantees that it will not be imposed were obtained.2" The resolution
stated that:
[The European Parliament h]opes that those countries which are members
of the Council of Europe, and have not done so, will undertake to abolish
the death penalty (in the case of exceptional crimes, this applies to Cyprus,
Malta and Switzerland, and in the case of both ordinary and exceptional
crimes, to Turkey and Poland), together with those countries which are
members of the CSCE, in which the death penalty still exists (Bulgaria,
United States of America, Commonwealth of Independent States, Yugosla-
via, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, and Albania).2"9
It urged the United Nations to adopt a "binding decision imposing a general




Death penalty practice has also been a factor in assessing human rights
within states whose recognition is being considered by the European Union.
In its opinion on the recognition of Slovenia, the Arbitration Commission
presided by French judge Robert Badinter took note of the abolition of the
death penalty in the Constitution of Slovenia."2
In October 1997, the European Union adopted the Treaty of Amster-
dam,' which amends the various conventions concerning the body and its
215. See id. (discussing abolition of death penalty in European Union) (footnote omitted).
216. See id. (discussing abolition of death penalty in European Union).
217. See id. (discussing abolition of death penalty in European Union).
218. See id. (discussing abolition of death penalty in European Union).
219. See id. (discussing abolition of death penalty in European Union).
220. See id (discussing abolition of death penalty in European Union).
221. See Opinion No. 7, On International Recognition of the Republic ofSlovenia by the
European Community and Its Member States, 31 I.L.M. 1512, 1516, § 3(a)(i) (1992) (noting
prohibition on death penalty in Slovenian Constitution).
222. See Treaty ofAmsterdam, in THETREATYOFAMsTERDAM: TExT AND CoMMENTARY
209-322 (Andrew Duff ed., 1997).
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components. The instrument was completed with a series of declarations, the
first of which concerns the death penalty. It states:
With reference to Article F(2) of the Treaty on European Union, the Con-
ference recalls that Protocol No. 6 to the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome
on 4 November 1950, and which has been signed and ratified by a large
majority of Member States, provides for the abolition of the death penalty.
In this context, the Conference notes the fact that since the signature of
the abovementioned Protocol on 28 April 1983, the death penalty has been
abolished in most of the Member States of the Union and has not been
applied in any of them.'
IV International Criminal Law
The first truly international trials were held in the aftermath of World
War II and led, in many cases, to capital executions.224 The Charter of the
International Military Tribunal authorized the Nuremberg court to impose
upon a convicted war criminal "death or such other punishment as shall be
determined by itto be just."2" Many oftheNazi defendants were condemned
to death, although a few received lengthy prison terms and some were acquit-
ted. The Sovietjudge expressed, as an individual opinion, the minority view
that all of those convicted should also have been sentenced to death. Those
condemned to death were subsequently executed within a few weeks, with the
exception of G6ring, who committed suicide hours before the time fixed for
sentence. 6 A series of successor trials were held in Nuremberg pursuant to
Control Council Law No. 10." Again, large numbers of defendants were
sentenced to death or to various lesser punishments, including life imprison-
ment or lengthy terms of detention. At the Tokyo Trial, seven defendants
were sentenced to death and fifteen defendants were sentenced to life impris-
223. See Declaration on the Abolition of the Death Penalty, in THE TREATY OF AMSTER-
DAM: TEXT AND COMMENTARY, supra note 222, at 309.
224. See William A. Schabas, War Crimes, Crimes against Humanity and the Death
Penalty, 60 ALB. L. REV. 733, 733 (1997) (noting that "the first international war crimes
tribunals, created in the aftermath of the Second World War, made widespread use of the death
penalty").
225. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the
European Axis, Charter of the International Military Tribunal, supra note 3, art. 27, at 300.
226. See In re Goering and Others, 13 I.L.R. 203-22 (Int'l Mil. Trib. 1946); see also LES
PROCE.S DE NUREMBERG ET DE TOKYO (Annette Wieviorka ed., 1996); TELFORD TAYLOR, THE
ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS, A PERSONAL MEMOIR (1992).
227. Control Council Law No. 10: Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes
Against Peace and Against Humanity, supra note 3.
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onment. The president of the Tokyo Tribunal penned a separate opinion
that seemed to favor sentences other than death:
Itmay well be that the punishment of imprisonment for life under sustained
conditions of hardship in an isolated place or places outside Japan - the
usual conditions in such cases - would be a greater deterrent to men like
the accused than the speedy termination of existence on the scaffold or
before a firing squad.229
In answer to arguments that these sentences breached the rule nulla
poena sine lege, it was said that "[i]nternational law lays down that a war
criminal may be punished with death whatever crimes he may have commit-
ted."'' O The 1940 United States Army Manual Rules of Land Warfare de-
clared that "[a]ll war crimes are subject to the death penalty, although a lesser
penalty may be imposed."'" A postwar Norwegian court answered a defen-
dant's plea that the death penalty did not apply to the offense as charged by
finding that violations of the laws and customs of war had always been pun-
ishable by death at international law."2 Early efforts to establish an interna-
tional criminal justice system considered the appropriateness of the death
penalty. A preliminary draft of the Convention for the Prevention and Punish-
ment of the Crime of Genocide suggested that the maximum penalty for
genocide be capital punishment. 3 A group of three experts involved in
drafting the Genocide Convention, Donnadieu de Vabres, Pella, and Lemkin,
revived provisions from a 1937 treaty that had never come into force that
228. United States v. Araki, in 20 THETOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIAL 49,854 to 49,858 (R.
John Pritchard & Sonia Magbanua Zaide eds., 1981).
229. The Separate Opinion of the President of the Tribunal, Sir William Flood Webb, in
21 THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIAL, supra note 228, at 17; see B.V.A. ROLING & ANTONIO
CASSESE, THE TOKYO TRIAL AND BEYOND (1993).
230. 15 UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR
CRIMINALS 200 (1949).
231. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA WAR OFFICE, FM 27-10: BASIC FIELD MANUAL, RULES
OF LAND WARFARE, 357, at 89 (1940).
232. See Public Prosecutor v. Klinge, 13 1.L.R. 262,263-64 (Nor. Sup. Ct. 1946) (discuss-
ing war crimes and international law).
233. See UNITEDNATIONS, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, 5TH SESS., DRAFT CONVEN-
TION FOR THE PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT OF GENOCIDE, ANNEX I, ESTABLISHMENT OF A
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT FOR THE PUNISHMENT OF AcTs OF GENOCIDE,
art 38, U.N. Doc. E/447 (1947) [hereinafter ESTABLISHMENTOFAPERMANENTINTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT FOR THE PUNISHMENT OF ACTs OF GENOCIDE]; UNITED NATIONS, ECONOMIC
AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, 5TH SEss., DRAFT CONVENTION FOR THE PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT
OF GENOCIDE, ANNEXII, ESTABLISHMENT OF ANAD HOC INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURTFOR
THE PUNISHMENT OF ACTS OF GENOCIDE, art. 32, U.N. Doc. E/447 (1947) [hereinafter ESTAB-
LISHMENT OF AN AD HOC INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT FOR THE PUNISHMENT OF ACTS OF
GENOCIDE].
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provided for capital punishment for serious international crimes. 34 But only
a few years later, a draft provision proposed by the International Law Com-
mission for its Draft Code of Offences Against The Peace and Security of
Mankind avoided any categorical reference to capital punishment: "The pen-
alty for any offence defined in this Code shall be determined by the tribunal
exercising jurisdiction over the individual accused, taking into account the
gravity of the offence." 5
A General Assembly committee subsequently recommended that the
statute of the proposed international criminal court contain only the most
general of provisions dealing with sentencing and suggested the phrase "the
court shall impose such penalties as it may determine.""2  Moreover, the
General Assembly committee even stated that the statute might exclude
certain forms of punishment, such as the death penalty."
The Cold War intervened to arrest further developments in international
justice, and only in 1989 did the General Assembly revive the proposal to
establish an international court. In the interim, as we have already discussed,
international human rights law progressed from a somewhat benign tolerance
of capital punishment to direct and outright opposition. When the issue of
sentencing came before the International Law Commission in 1991, special
rapporteur Doudou Thiam formally prescribed that capital punishment be
excluded from the Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind
and that a maximum sentence of life imprisonment be provided.3 Although
a few members of the Commission argued that capital punishment should not
be abandoned,' 9 the vast majority disagreed, given the international trend in
234. See ESTABLISHMENT OF A PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT FOR THE
PUNISHMENT OF AcTs OF GENOCIDE, supra note 233, art. 38; ESTABLISHMENT OF AN AD Hoc
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURTFORTHEPUNISHMENTOFACTS OF GENOCIDE,supra note 233,
art. 32.
235. Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, art. 5, [1951] 2
Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 133, 137, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1951/Add.1.
236. See Report ofthe Committee on International CriminalJurisdiction, U.N. GAOR,.7th
Sess., Supp. No. 11, §§ 110-11, at 113, U.N. Doc. A/2136 (1952). "The Court shall impose
upon an accused, upon conviction, such penalty as the Court may determine, subject to any
limitations prescribed in the instrument conferring jurisdiction upon the Court." Id. Annex I,
art. 32, at 23.
237. Id.§111.
238. See Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security, [1991] 2 Y.B. Int'l L.
Comm'n, pt. 1, § 29,37,40, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/435 and Add.1 (1991). For a discussion ofthis
proposal by the International Law Commission, see Summary Records of the 2207th-2214th
Meetings, [1991] 1 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 4-52, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1991 (1991);
Document A/46/10: Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Forty-
Third Session (29 April-19 July 1991), [1991] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 1, pt. 2, §§ 70-105, 80-
85, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/19911Add.1 (1991) [hereinafter Document A/46/101.
239. See Summary Records of the 2211th Meeting, [1991] 1 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n § 15,
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favor of abolition of the death penalty.24 Several members also expressed
their reservations about sentences of life imprisonment, which they said were
also a form of cruel, inhuman, and degrading punishment.24 The draft statute
for an international criminal court, adopted by the Commission in 1994, stated
that a person convicted under the statute would be subject to imprisonment,
up to and including life imprisonment, but capital punishment was not envi-
sioned.242 During subsequent debates on the statute in the Preparatory Com-
mittee and the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly, there have been
occasional, isolated attempts to revive capital punishment, butthese now seem
clearly condemned to rejection.243
28, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A1991 (1991); Summary Records of the 2212th Meeting, [1991]
I Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n §§ 19, 28, 33, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER. A/1991 (1991); Summary
Records of the 2213th Meeting, [1991] 1 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n § 55, 40, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/
SER.A/1991 (1991). Special rapporteur Thiam promised that the Commission's report would
state that "two or three of its members had expressed reservations" about exclusion of the death
penalty. Id. § 59,40, U.N. Doc. ACN.4/SER.A/1991 (1991). The report eventually stated that
"many members of the Commission supported" excluding the death penalty and "[s]ome other
members opposed" excluding the death penalty. Id.; see Document A/46/10, supra note 238,
§§ 84-85.
240. See Summary Records of the 2207th Meeting, supra note 238, §§ 23-24; Summary
Records of the 2208th Meeting, supra note 238, §§ 2,21, 30; Summary Records ofthe 2209th
Meeting, supra note 238, §§ 5, 29; Summary Records of the 2210th Meeting, supra note 238,
§§ 25,33, 46; Summary Records ofthe 2212thMeeting, supra note 239, § 4; SummaryRecords
of the 2213th Meeting, supra note 239, §§ 12, 23, 33.
241. Summary Records of the 2208th Meeting, supra note 238, §§ 10 (Graefrath), 21
(Calero Rodriguez); Summary Records ofthe 2209th Meeting, supra note 238, § 19 (Barboza);
Summary Records of the 2210th Meeting, supra note 238, § 47 (Njenga); Summary Records of
the 2212th Meeting, supra note 239, § 4 (Solari Tudela); see Document A/46/10, supra note
238, § 88. The German Constitutional Court has suggested that life imprisonment without
possibility of parole constitutes cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment. See DONALD P.
KOMMERs, THECONSTmONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THEFEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY314-
20 (1989) (discussing Life Imprisonment Case (1977) 45 BVerGE 187).
242. See Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Forty-sixth
Session, 3 May-23 July 1994, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 123-25, U.N. Doc.
A/49/10 (1994); see also Report ofthe InternationalLaw Commission on the Work ofIts Forty-
seventh Session, U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 63-64, U.N. Doc. A/50/10 (1995).
243. See UNITED NATIONS, DISCUSSION TURNS TO RANGE AND DEFINITION OF PENALTIES
IN DRAFT STATUTE IN PREPARATORY COMMTTEE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, U.N.
Doc. L/2805 (1996); UNITED NATIONS, PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT DISCUSSES DEFINITION OF CRIMES; POTENTIAL USE OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT,
U.N. Doc. L/2806 (1996); UNITED NATIONS, PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT CONCLUDES SECOND SESSION, U.N. Doc. L/2813 (1996); UNITED NATIONS,
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT SHOULD BE INDEPENDENT BODY, AND NOT SUBSIDIARY OF
SECURITYCOUNCIL, SPEAKERSTELLLEGAL COMMITTEE, U.N. Doc. GA/L/3044 (1997); UNITED
NATIONS, UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE TELLS LEGAL COMMITrEE INTERNATIONAL CRIMI-
NAL COURT SHOULDNOTBE DIRECT PART OF UNITEDNATIONS, U.N. Doc. GA/L/3046 (1997);
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While the debate had been underway in the International Law Com-
mission and the Preparatory Committee, the Security Council had also ad-
dressed the issue of sentencing when it set up the ad hoe tribunals for the
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The statutes of the two ad hoe tribunals
contain brief provisions dealing with sentencing, proposing essentially that
sentences be limited to imprisonment (thereby tacitly excluding the death
penalty, as well as corporal punishment, imprisonment with hard labor, and
fines) and that they be established while taking into account the "general
practice" of the criminal courts in the former Yugoslavia or Rwanda.' The
exclusion of the death penalty by the International Tribunal is a particularly
sore point with Rwanda. In the Security Council, Rwanda claimed there
would be a fundamental injustice in exposing criminals tried by its domestic
courts to execution if those tried by the international tribunal- presumably the
masterminds of the genocide - would only be subject to life imprisonment.245
Rwanda's representative stated that "[s]ince it is foreseeable that the Tribunal
will be dealing with suspects who devised, planned and organized the geno-
cide, these may escape capital punishment whereas those who simply carried
out their plans would be subjected to the harshness of this sentence." '246 He
also stated, "[t]hat situation is not conducive to national reconciliation in
UNITED NATIONS, DELEGATES DIFFER ON WHETHER STATUTE OF PROPOSED INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT SHOULD COVER CRIME OF "AGGRESSION," U.N. Doc. GA/L/3047 (1997);
UNITED NATIONS, SPEAKERS IN LEGAL COMMIrEE CALL FOR REVIEW OF STATUTES OF UN
ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL, U.N. Doc. GA/L/3048 (1997).
244. See STATUTEOFTHEINTERNATIONALTRIBUNALFORTHEFORMERYUGOSLAVIA, supra
note 5, art. 24; STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA, supra note 5, art. 23.
Several works discuss the ad hoc tribunals generally. See generally M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI &
PETER MANKAS, THE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA (1996); DAI TRIBUNALI PENALI INTERNAZIONALI AD HOC A UNA CORTE PER-
MANENTE (Flavia Lattanzi & Elena Sciso eds., 1996); KARINE LESCURE, LE TRIBUNAL PENAL
INTERNATIONAL POURL'EX-YOUGOSLAVIE(1994); VIRGIN,1AMORRIS &MICHAEL P. SCHARFAN
INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
(1995); Morten Bergsmo, The Establishment of the International Tribunal on War Crimes, 14
HUM. RTS. L.J. 371, 371-73 (1993); Eric David, Le tribunal international pdnal pour l'ex-
Yougoslavie, 25 REV. BELGE DROIT INT'L 565, 565-98 (1992); Jules Deschenes, Toward
International Criminal Justice, 5 CRIM. L.F. 249,249-77 (1994); David Forsythe, Politics and
the International Tribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia, 5 CRIM. L.F. 401,401-22 (1994); Melissa
Gordon, Justice on Trial: The Efficacy of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, 1 ILSA J.
INT'L COMP. L. 217, 217-42 (1995); Christopher Greenwood, The International Tribunal for
Former Yugoslavia, 69 INT'L AFF. 641, 641-55 (1993); Theodor Meron, War Crimes in
Yugoslavia and the Development ofInternational Law, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 78, 78-87 (1994);
Daphna Shraga & Ralph Zacklin, The International Criminal Tribunalfor the Former Yugosla-
via, 5 EUR. J. INT'L L. 360, 360-80 (1994).
245. See UNITED NATIONS, SECURITY COUNCIL, THE SITUATION CONCERNING RWANDA,
at 16, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3453 (1984).
246. Id.
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Rwanda."247 But to counter this argument, the representative of New Zealand
reminded Rwanda that "[f]or over three decades the United Nations has been
trying progressively to eliminate the death penalty. It would be entirely
unacceptable- and a dreadful step backwards- to introduce it here."248 Since
domestic trials began in Rwanda in December 1996, more than one hundred
persons have been sentenced to death, although these sentences have not yet
been carried out.249 In fact, Rwanda has not imposed capital punishment since
1982, and in 1992, President Habyarimana systematically commuted all
outstanding death sentences." ° According to the United Nations Secretary-
General, Rwanda is now considered a de facto abolitionist state because it has
not conducted executions for more than ten years."s Even the program of the
Rwandese Patriotic Front calls for abolition of the death penalty. Further-
more, in the 1993 Arusha peace accords, which have constitutional force in
Rwanda, the government undertook to ratify the Second Optional Protocol to
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, aiming at Abolition
of the Death Penalty, although it has not yet formally taken this step? 2
Recent legislation adopted by Rwanda in order to expedite trials of genocide
suspects abolishes the death penalty for the vast majority of offenders, who




Extradition has become an important indirect way in which international
law promotes the abolition of the death penalty. Since the late nineteenth
century, extradition treaties have contained clauses by which states parties
may refuse extradition for capital offenses in the requesting state unless a satis-
factory assurance will be given that the death penalty not be imposed. Such
247. Id
248. Id. at 5.
249. See William A. Schabas, Justice, Democracy and Impunity in Post-Genocide
Rwanda: Searching for Solutions to Impossible Problems, 8 CRIM. L.F. 523, 560 (1997).
250. Arrgt& prisidentiel No. 103/105, Mesure de grdce du 13 Mars 1992, in 1 CODE FT
Lois DUE RWANDA 432 (Filip Reyntens & Jan Gorus eds., 2d ed. 1995).
251. See UNITED NATIONs, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SAFEGUARDS GUARANTEEING THEPROTECTIONOF THERIGHTS OF THOSE
FACINGTHEDEATHPENALTY: REPORTOFTHE SECRETARY-GENERAL, § 36, U.N. Doe. E/1995/78
(1995); see also AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, The Death Penalty: List ofAbolitionistandReten-
tionist Countries (Sept., 1985), AI Index: ACT 50/06/95, Sept. 1985.
252. Protocole sur les Questions Diverses et Dispositions Finales, art. 15, in 1 CODE ET
Lois DUE RwANDA, supra note 250, at 18, 20.
253. See WLLIAMA.SCHABAS&MARTNIMBLEAU,INTRODUCTIONTORWANDANLAW44,
59-60 (1997) (discussing death penalty).
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provisions can be found as early as 1889, in the South American Convention,
in the 1892 extradition treaty between the United Kingdom and Portugal, in
the 1908 extradition treaty between the United States and Portugal, and in the
1912 treaty prepared by the International Commission of Jurists. 54 These
clauses have now become a form of "boilerplate" international law and are
contained in model extradition treaties adopted within international organiza-
tions including the United Nations." Several important cases have been
heard by courts in Europe and Canada concerning extradition to the United
States. As a result of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights,
extradition to the United States from Europe is now virtually contingent on
such assurances, while in Canada, the position is not nearly as clear.
The European Commission of Human Rights first addressed the question
of extradition to the death rows on the other side of the Atlantic in Kirkwood
v. United Kingdom," a case originating in California. Kirkwood's applica-
tion was declared inadmissible, not because the argument itself was flawed,
but because he had failed to demonstrate that detention on "death row" was
inhuman and degrading treatment within the meaning of article 3." The issue
returned to the Strasbourg organs several years later in the case of Jens
Soering, who had been arrested in the United Kingdom under an extradition
warrant issued at the request of the United States.258 In ajudgment issued on
July 7, 1989,259 the European Court of Human Rights confirmed that circum-
254. See GEOFF GILBERT, ASPECTS OF EXTRADITIONLAW 99-100 (1991); American lnsti-
tute of International Law, Project No. 17,20 AM. J. INT'L L. 331,331-35 (Supp. 1926); Draft
Convention on Extradition, 29 AM. J. INT'LL. 15,228 (Supp. 1935); P. Leboucq, Influence en
mati~re d'extradition de lapeine applicable dans lepaysrequirant, 38 J.DUDROIT INT'L 437
(1911); J.S. Reeves, Extradition Treaties and the Death Penalty, 18 AM. J. INT'L L. 298,298-
300 (1924); Sharon A. Williams, Extradition to a State that Imposes the Death Penalty, 1990
CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 117, 117-68; Sharon A. Williams, Human Rights Safeguards andInterna-
tional Cooperation in Extradition: Striking the Balance, 3 CRIM. L.F. 191, 191-224 (1992);
Sharon A. Williams, Nationality, Double Jeopardy, Prescription and the Death Sentence as
Bases for Refusing Extradition, 62 INT'L REV. PENAL L. 259, 259-80 (1991).
255. See UNITED NATIONS, EIGHTH UNITED NATIONS CONGRESS ON THE PREVENTON OF
CRIMES AND THE TREATMENT OF OFFENDERS, MODEL TREATY ON EXTRADITION, art. 4, at 75,
U.N. Doc. AICONF.144/28 (1990); Inter-American Convention on Extradition, art. 9,20 I.L.M.
723, 724 (1981); European Convention on Extradition, Dec. 13, 1957, art. 11,359 U.N.T.S.
273,282. The Italian Constitutional Courthas ruled that article 11 ofthe European Convention
on Extradition does not codify a customary rule of international law. See Re Cuillier, Ciambor-
rani and Vallon, 78 I.L.R. 93, 94 (1988) (Italy, Constitutional Court).
256. 37 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 158.
257. See Kirkwood v. United Kingdom, 37 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 158, 184
(1984).
258. See 2 VINcENTBERGER, CASELAWOFTHEEUROPEANCOURTOFHUMANRIGHTS 118-
23 (1992) (discussing Soering); Warbrick, supra note 72, at 1085-95 (same).
259. See Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 8 (1989).
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stances relating to a death sentence could give rise to issues respecting the
prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment and concluded
that if the United Kingdom were to extradite Soering to Virginia, this would
constitute a breach of the European Convention.
Although the court has not revisited the question since Soering, the
European Commission on Human Rights has been called upon to interpret the
Soeringjudgment. In January 1994, it ruled an application from an individual
subjectto extradition to the United States for a capital offense to be inadmissi-
ble.26 The Commission considered the guarantees that had been provided by
the Dallas County prosecutor to the French government, stating that if extradi-
tion were granted, "the State of Texas [would] not seek the death penalty," to
be sufficient.26" ' Texas law stated that the death penalty could only be pro-
nounced if requested by the prosecution. The fugitive had claimed that the
undertaking was "vague and imprecise."262 Furthermore, she argued that it
had been furnished by the federal authorities through diplomatic channels and
did not bind the executive or judicial authorities of the State of Texas.263 The
Commission compared the facts with those in Soering, in which the prosecu-
tor had made a clear intention to seek the death penalty.2' The Commission
found the Texas prosecutor's attitude to be fundamentally different265 and
concurred with an earlier decision of the French Conseil d'Etat holding the
undertaking to be satisfactory.2"
Still more recently, the Commission considered the case of Lei Ch'an
Wa, threatened with extradition from Macao to China for a capital crime,
trafficking in narcotics.267 The representative of the Chinese news agency
Xinhua, which unofficially represented China's interests in Macao, had stated
that the death penalty would not be imposed in the event of extradition, which
was allowed by the Portuguese extradition legislation in force in Macao.268
260. See Aylor-Davis v. France, 76-B Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 164, 173 (1994).
261. Id. at 167.
262. Id. at 171.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 172.
266. See Dame Joy Davis-Aylor, Conseil d'Etat, Oct. 15, 1993, D. 1993 inf. rap. 238;
Christian Vigeuroux, Les engagements d'un Etat itranger en matiare d'extradition, in REVUE
FRANCAISEDEDROITADMNISTRATIF 1166 (1993).
267. Lei Ch'an Wav. Portugal, Eur. Comm'n H.R. App. No. 25410/94 (Nov. 27, 1995)
(unreported decision on file with Washington& Lee Law Review); Yuk Leung v. Portugal, Eur.
Comm'n H.R. App. 24464/94 (Nov. 27, 1995) (unreported decision on file with Washington
& Lee Law Review).
268. Lei Ch'an Wa, Eur. Comm'n H.R. App. No. 25410/94; Yuk Leung, Eur. Comm'n
H.R. App. 24464/94.
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However, Portugal's constitution says that extradition is forbidden for crimes
for which the death penalty is provided in the receiving state's legislation.269
In other words, extradition was forbidden by the constitution, despite the
existence of an assurance from the representative of China. The Constitu-
tional Court held that under the circumstances, extradition was prohibited.270
In the meantime, Lei had registered an application with the European Com-
mission, which issued provisional measures pursuant to article 36 of its
Regulations.27' However, once the Constitutional Court had settled the matter,
the problem was resolved, and the Commission decided that it was unneces-
sary to examine further the application.272 In another case, involving extra-
dition from Austria to the Russian Federation to stand trial for murder, the
Commission noted a maximum sentence often years in the Penal Code of the
Russian Federation, observed that the two accomplices had been sentenced to
nine years, and concluded that "there are no substantial grounds for believing
that the applicant faces a real risk of being subjected to the death penalty in
the Russian Federation.,
273
Protocol No. 6 has also been cited in domestic law in cases concerning
extradition of fugitives to states imposing the death penalty. On two occa-
sions, the French Conseil d'Etat has refused to extradite, expressing the view
that Protocol No. 6 establishes a European ordrepublic that prohibits extradi-
tion in capital cases.274 The Supreme Court of the Netherlands took a similar
view, invoking the Protocol in refusing to return a United States service-
man,275 although required to do so by the NATO Status of Forces Agree-
ment 276 The court considered that the European Convention and its Protocol
269. Lei Ch'an Wa, Eur. Comm'n H.R. App. No. 25410/94; Yuk Leung, Eur. Comm'n
H.R. App. 24464/94.
270. Lei Ch'an Wa, Eur. Comm'n H.R. App. No. 25410/94; Yuk Leung, Eur. Comm'n
H.R. App. 24464/94.
271. Lei Ch'an Wa, Eur. Comm'n H.R. App. No. 25410/94; Yuk Leung, Eur. Comm'n
H.R. App. 24464/94.
272. Lei Ch'an Wa, Eur. Comm'n H.R. App. No. 25410/94; Yuk Leung, Eur. Comm'n
H.R. App. 24464/94; Meng v. Portugal, 83-A Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 88, 90 (1995).
273. Raidl v. Austria, 82-A Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 134, 144-45 (1995).
274. See Fidan, Conseil d'Etat, Feb. 27, 1987, D. 1987, II, 305, concl. M. Bonichot;
Gacem, Conseil d'Etat, Dec. 14, 1987, I Semainejuridique IV-86. Fidan was cited by Judge
De Meyer in his concurring opinion in Soering v. United Kingdom. See Soering v. United
Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 52 n.2 (1989).
275. See Short v. Netherlands, 29 I.L.M. 1375 (1990); see also Steven J. Lepper, Short v.
The Kingdom of the Netherlands: Is It Time to Renegotiate the NATO Status of Forces
Agreement?, 24 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 867, 874 (1991); Major John E. Parkerson, Jr. &
Major Steven J. Lepper, Commentary on Short v. Kingdom of the Netherlands, 85 AM. J. INT'L
L. 698, 698-702 (1991).
276. Agreement Between the Parties to the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the
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No. 6 took precedence over the other treaty.
In June 1996, Italy's Constitutional Court took judicial opposition to
extradition for capital crimes one step further when it refused to send Pietro
Venezia to the United States despite assurances from American prosecutors
that the death penalty would not be sought or imposed.2" Venezia's extradi-
tion to Dade County, Florida had been requested by the United States, pursu-
ant to the Treaty of Extradition dated October 13, 1983.278 Article IX of the
treaty entitles Italy to request that extradition be conditional upon an undertak-
ing by the United States that the death penalty not be imposed.279 The United
States government gave assurances in the form of a note verbale on July 28,
1994, August 24, 1995, and January 12, 1996.280 But this was not enough for
the Italian Constitutional Court.
According to the judgment of the court, the prohibition of capital punish-
ment is of special importance, like all sentences that violate humanitarian
principles, in the first part of the Constitution.28" ' The right to life is the first
of the inviolable human rights, enshrined in article 2.2"2 The judgment also
stated that the absolute character of this constitutional guarantee is of signifi-
cance to the exercise of powers attributed to all public authorities under the
republican system, and specifically with respect to international judicial co-
operation for the purposes of mutual judicial assistance.283 The court noted
that it had already stated that the participation of Italy in punishments that
cannot be imposed within Italy in peacetime constitutes a breach of the
Constitution.284
Status of Their Forces, June 19, 1951, 199 U.N.T.S. 67.
Note that on 19 June 1995, the States parties to the NATO treaty finalized the
Agreement among the States Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty and the Other
States Participating in the Partnership for Peace Regarding the Status of Their
Forces together with an Additional Protocol. Article 1 of the Additional Protocol
states: "Insofar as it has jurisdiction according to the provisions of the agreement,
each State party to the present additional protocol shall not carry out a death
sentence with regard to any member of a force and its civilian component, and their
dependants from any other state party to the present additional protocol."
SCHABAS, supra note 11, at 254 n.174.
277. See Andrea Bianchi, Venezia v. Ministero di Grazia e Guistizia, 91 AM. J. INT'L L.
727, 727 (1997) (discussing Venezia).
278. See Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and
the Government of the Republic of Italy, Oct. 1983, U.S.-Italy, 35 U.S.T. 3026.
279. See id. art. IX.
280. See Bianchi, supra note 276, at 728.
281. See id. at 727.
282. See id. at 728.
283. See id.
284. See id.
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Referring to the mechanism by which the Italian authorities consider the
sufficiency of the undertaking by the United States authorities not to impose
capital punishment, the Italian Constitutional Court held that:
The extradition of a fugitive indicted for a crime for which capital punish-
ment is provided by the law of the requesting state would violate Articles
2 and 27 of the Italian Constitution, regardless of the sufficiency of the
assurances provided by the requesting state that the death penalty would
not be imposed or, if imposed, would not be executed.8 5
As a result, the court declared provisions of the code of penal procedure
designed to give effect to the extradition treaty between Italy and the United
States to be contrary to the Constitution.286 It also declared that the portion of
Law 225 of March 26, 1984, implementing article IX of the extradition treaty,
was unconstitutional.2 7 Venezia had also filed an application with the Euro-
pean Commission of Human Rights. The Commission decided to strike the
case from its docket as a result of the judgment of the Italian Constitutional
Court.
28
Canadian courts have been reluctant to follow the European prece-
dents,8 9 although a recent judgment suggests that they will be increasingly
severe in granting extradition in capital cases. In United States ofAmerica v.
Burns and Rafay,29 issued on June 30, 1997, the British Columbia Court of
Appeal overruled the decision of the Canadian Minister of Justice to allow
extradition in a capital offense without seeking an assurance that the death
penalty would be imposed.291 Article VI of the Extradition Treaty between
Canada and the United States declares:
When the offense for which extradition is requested is punishable by death
under the laws of the requesting State and the laws of the requested State
do not permit such punishment for that offense, extradition may be refused
unless the requesting State provides such assurances as the requested State
considers sufficient that the death penalty shall not be imposed, or, if




288. See Venezia v. Italy, 87-A Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 140, 150 (1996) (striking
case from docket).
289. See, e.g., Kindler v. Canada, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 779.
290. [1997] 116 C.C.C.3d 524 (B.C.C.A.).
291. United States of America v. Bums and Rafay, [1997] 116 C.C.C.3d 524, 542-43
(B.C.C.A.).
292. Treaty on Extradition Between the United States of America and Canada, Dec. 3,
1971, U.S.-Can., art. 6, 27 U.S.T. 983, 989.
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Bums and Rafay were both eighteen at the time of the crime, a brutal murder
of Rafay's parents.293 They were charged by the State of Washington with
aggravated first degree murder, punishable by sentence of death.294 Canada
abolished the death penalty for common law crimes in 1976.295 Although the
death penalty still exists under military law, it has not been imposed for more
than fifty years, and a pending revision of the National Defense Act plans to
eliminate capital punishment from the Canadian statute books altogether.
Justice Donald, writing for the majority of the British Columbia Court of
Appeal, admitted that he could not refuse extradition on the basis of section
12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights of Freedoms, which prohibits cruel and
unusual punishment, 296 or section 7 of the Charter, which enshrines the right
to life,297 given the 1991 judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada in Kindler
v. Canada.298 However, he concluded that because Bums and Rafay were
Canadian citizens, their extradition would violate § 6(1) of the Charter, which
declares that "[e]very citizen of Canada has the right to enter, remain in and
leave Canada. ' 299 As dissenting Justice McEachern noted, § 6(1) is subject
to the limitation clause of § 1, which instructs the courts to subject Charter
rights to the test of "reasonable limits in a free and democratic society."300
Following an analytical approach developed by the European Court of Human
Rights in the application of similar provisions,3"' Canadian courts consider
whether the legal rule that violates the Charter right has a legitimate purpose
293. Burns and Rafay, [1997] 116 C.C.C.3d at 530.
294. Id. at 530-31.
295. Id. at 531.
296. Constitution Act, 1982, R.S.C., App. II, No. 44, § 12 (1985) (Can.).
297. Id. § 7.
298. United States of America v. Bums and Rafay, [1997] 116 C.C.C.3d 524, 536
(B.C.C.A.); see Kindler v. Canada, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 779. For further discussion of the Kindler
decision, see Donald K. Piragoff& Marcia V.J. Kran, The Impact ofHuman Rights Principles
on Extradition from Canada and the United States: The Role of National Courts, 3 CRIM. L.
F. 225, 225-70 (1992); William A. Schabas, Extradition etpeine de mort: le Canada renvoie
deuxfugitifs au couloir de la mort, 4 REvuBUNIVERSELLEDES DROrrs DEL'HOMME 65, 65-70
(1992); William A. Schabas, Kindler andNg: Our Supreme Magistrates Take a Frightening
Step into the Court of Public Opinion, 51 REVUE BARREAU 673, 673-91 (1991); William A.
Schabas, Kindler v. Canada, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 128, 128-33 (1993); Sharon A. Williams,
Extradition and the Death Penalty Exception in Canada: Resolving the Ng and Kindler Cases,
13 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 799, 799-839 (1991).
299. United States of America v. Bums and Rafay, [1997] 116 C.C.C.3d 524, 533, 536
(B.C.C.A.); Constitution Act, 1982, R.S.C., App. II, No. 44, § 6(1) (1985) (Can.).
300. See Burns and Rafay, [1997] 116 C.C.C.3d at 543 (McEachern, J., dissenting)
(quoting Constitution Act, 1982, R.S.C., App. II, No. 44, § 6(1) (1985) (Can.)).
301. See generally WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND THE
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and whether it constitutes a minimal infringement upon the right in question.
The Supreme Court of Canada had already determined that extradition consti-
tutes an acceptable limit on the right of Canadians to remain in Canada." 2 But
according to Justice Donald, execution of Burns and Rafay would violate their
right to return to Canada upon completion of their sentence, something that
extradition for noncapital offenses would not.3"3 Given alternatives, specifi-
cally a sentence of life imprisonment, it was clear that extradition without an
assurance that the death penalty would not be imposed failed the minimal
impairment test. He wrote:
The simple point taken by the applicants in the present case, with which I
am in full agreement, is that their return to Canada is impossible if they are
put to death.... By handing over the applicants to the American authori-
ties without an assurance, the Minister will maximally, not minimally,
impair the applicants' rights of citizenship.3 4
Although bound by precedent of the Supreme Court of Canada that
allows the extradition of noncitizens for capital offenses - case law that,
incidentally, has been criticized by other courts in other countries 30 5 - Justice
Donald's reasons suggest that he is opposed to extradition for capital offenses
in general. He wrote:
With respect, the Minister appears to have given only lip service to a
fundamentally important aspect of Canadian policy, namely, that we have
decided through our elected representatives that we will not put our killers
to death [on the reflected] will of the majority and their concern for the
sanctity of life and the dignity of the person.3"
He cited the reasons of Supreme Court Justice Peter Cory, who dissented in
Kindler, referring to the fact that Canada's Parliament rejected the death
penalty in two separate free votes. °7 Criticizing the executive decision to
extradite Burns and Rafay without the assurance that capital punishment
would not be imposed, he stated:
The Minister confesses his support for abolition but then fails to act on his
conviction. Apart from trying to have it both ways, the problem with the
302. United States of America v. Cotroni, United States of America v. El Zein, [1989] 1
S.C.R. 1469, 1470.
303. Burns and Rafay, [1997] 116 C.C.C.3d at 534-35.
304. Id. at 534.
305. See Pratt v. Attorney General for Jamaica, [1994] 2 App. Cas. I (P.C. 1993) (appeal
taken from Jamaica).
306. United States of America v. Bums and Rafay, [1997] 116 C.C.C.3d 524, 541-42
(B.C.C.A.).
307. Id.
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Minister's thinking is that he treats the policy question about the death
penalty in Canada as undecided and at large. This approach led him to give
effect to the minority view on the death penalty as far as these applicants
are concerned."'
Burns and Rafay is being appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada. That
court, in a four to three decision, authorized the extradition of Joseph Kindler
in 1991. Yet even the Kindler decision suggests the court's discomfort with
the death penalty, as six of the seven justices indicated that capital punish-
ment, were it to be imposed in Canada, would violate the right to life and the
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.
VI. Conclusion
In his 1995 report to the Economic and Social Council," 9 English crimi-
nologist Roger Hood concluded that "there has been a considerable shift
towards the abolition of the death penalty both dejure and in practice" in the
years 1989 through 1993.31 After consulting other sources, Professor Hood
observed that "it appears that since 1989 24 countries have abolished capital
punishment, 22 of them for all crimes in peacetime or in wartime. 311 Over
the same period, the death penalty was reintroduced in four states.3 12 Profes-
sor Hood stated that "the picture that emerges is that an unprecedented num-
ber of countries have abolished or suspended the use of the death penalty.
3 13
Amnesty International issued revised figures in July 1997 that declared that
ninety-nine states have abolished the death penalty in law or in practice,
whereas ninety-four retain the death penalty. Amnesty International adds that
"the number of countries which actually execute prisoners in any one year is
much smaller."3 4
Capital punishment remains in force in many countries, and while the
situation continues to evolve, quite convincingly, in favor ofabolition, it is too
early to speak of customary or universal norms. There is nothing unusual
308. Id. at 542.
309. Pursuant to E.S.C. Res. 206, U.N. ESCOR, Supp. No. 1,at 65, U.N. Doc. E/1994/94
(1994).
310. CAPITAL PUNISHMENTAND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SAFEGUARDS GUARANTEEING THE
PROTECTION OFTHE RIGHTS OF THOSEFACING THE DEATHPENALTY: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-
GENERAL, supra note 251, § 32.
311. Id.§34.
312. Id. § 38.
313. Id.§ 87.
314. AMNESTYINTERNATIONAL, Facts and Figures on the Death Penalty, AI Index: ACT
50/08/97, July 1997. For an even more optimistic assessment, see generally THE INTERNA-
TIONAL SOURCEBOOK ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 51.
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here. One need only think of the emergence of other fundamental rights, such
as the prohibition of slavery and torture, sometimes qualified, with little
debate, as peremptory orjus cogens norms. Yet not so long ago - barely a
century, in the case of slavery- it was impossible to speak of any international
consensus on these matters. With that comparison in mind, can it be unrealis-
tic to lobk to the universal abolition of the death penalty, the consequence of
its international prohibition by human rights law, at some point in coming
decades?
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